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1
This essay focuses solely on UCC (“Code”) Article 2 as supplemented by
the relevant parts of Article 1. UCC §§ 1, 2 (West 14th ed 1995). The
incorporation principle is expressed in the Code sections dealing with course of
dealing and usage of trade, id at § 1-205, and course of performance, id at § 2208, as well as in the Code’s definition of “Agreement,” which includes “the
bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from
other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance.” Id at § 1-201(3). It is also at the heart of the Code’s duty of good
faith, which requires that merchants act in accordance with “the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade,” id at § 2-103(b),
which is to be “further implemented by Section 1-205 on course of dealing and
usage of trade,” id at § 1-203 cmt, as well as the Code’s interpretive approach,
which directs courts to determine “the meaning of the agreement of the parties .
. . by the language used by them and by their action, read and interpreted i n
light of commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances. The
measure and background for interpretation are set by the commercial context,
which may explain and supplement even the language of formal or final
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Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, and the modern Lex
3
Mercatoria, are based on the premise that unwritten customs and
usages of trade exist and that in commercial disputes they can, and
4
should, be discovered and applied by courts. The existence of
writing.” Id at § 1-205 cmt 1. See also id at § 2-301 cmt (“In order to
determine what is ‘in accordance with the contract’ under this Article usage of
trade, course of dealing and performance, and the general background of
circumstances must be given due consideration.”). The incorporation principle
is also embodied in numerous Code provisions and Official Comments that
direct courts to take into account “usages of trade,” “commercial standards,” “the
law merchant,” and other aspects of the contracting context in filling gaps. See
generally the obligations in UCC Art 2, Part 3 (“General Obligation and
Construction of Contract”) and its associated Official Comments. Less
noticeably, and typically ignored by commentators, the incorporation strategy,
in the form of explicit references to usages of trade, commercial standards, and
commercial context, as well as references to what is commercially reasonable,
reasonable, seasonable, and commercially impracticable, also runs through
numerous Code provisions (as explicated by their associated Official
Comments) that might broadly be termed “traffic rules” and that unlike gap
fillers are, as a practical matter, difficult, if not impossible, to negate. See
generally UCC Art 2, Part 2 (“Form, Formation and Readjustment”); Part 5
(“Performance”); Part 6 (“Breach, Repudiation and Excuse”); Part 7
(“Remedies”). Finally, most generally, one of the stated “[u]nderlying
purposes” of the Code is “to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties.” UCC at § 1102.
2
See, for example, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) Art 9(2) (1980), reprinted in United
Nations, Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 19 Intl
Materials 671, 674 (1980) (“The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed,
to have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of
trade which the parties knew or ought to have known and which i n
international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to
contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.”).
3
The term lex mercatoria is generally understood to include: international
conventions on the sale of goods, written compilations of custom like the
Incoterms (see note 137), as well as unwritten customs and practices that are
either specific to a particular trade or are applicable to all commercial
transactions. See, for example, Harold J. Berman and Felix J. Dassler, The
“New” Law Merchant and the “Old:” Sources, Content, and Legitimacy,” in Thomas
E. Carbonneau, ed, Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law
Merchant 21-36 (Transnational Juris 1990) (discussing the customary basis of
the lex mercatoria); and Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, i n
Carbonneau, Lex Mercatoria at 104-5 (same).
4
This Article’s discussion of the UCC focuses nearly exclusively on
disputes between merchants. Early drafts of the Code provided for the use of
either arbitrators or merchant juries to determine the content of trade usages

3
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commercial customs that can be discovered and codified by diligent
observers is also at the heart of some proposals for creating
5
commercial law in developing or formerly socialist countries. More
broadly, the idea that courts in deciding cases should look to
immanent business norms, consisting of both the practices of
contracting parties and unwritten customs, is a fundamental tenet of
the legal realist approach to contract interpretation, an approach
that was developed, championed, and ultimately codified by Karl
Llewellyn, a leading legal realist and the principal drafter of Article 2
6
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“Code”).
and other commercial standards. See, for example, 1941 Revised Uniform Sales
Act (Report and Second Draft) at § 59(I)(d) (setting out matters to be submitted
to merchant experts, including the effects on obligations of “mercantile usage”
or “usage of trade,” whether tender was conforming, whether an action was
reasonable, or any other “issue which requires for its competent determination
special merchants knowledge rather than general knowledge”). The failure to
include a merchant jury provision in the final Code was due to a need to obtain
political support for the proposed Code, not to Llewellyn’s abandonment of the
concept. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn
and the Merchant Rules, 100 Harv L Rev 465 (1987). Most of the objections to
the incorporation strategy put forth in this essay, however, would not be
weaker if a merchant jury provision had been included because they are not
based primarily on the limits of courts’ institutional competence.
5
See, for example, Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the PostCommunist Economies, 27 Cornell Intl L J 1 (1994) (suggesting that trade
associations should be formed to interpret and enforce contracts according to
commercial custom so that, over time, customs will become sufficiently well
developed to supply the basic principles of a public commercial law); Anthony
T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J L Econ & Org 5 (1985);
and Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U Pa L Rev 1643 (1996)
(suggesting that as the economy increases in complexity it becomes increasingly
important for courts to enforce certain types of business custom). Similarly,
commentators have suggested looking to usages of the trade to set standards for
electronic commerce. See, for example, Alejandro E. Almaguer and Roland W .
Baggott III, Shaping New Legal Frontiers: Dispute Resolution for the Internet, 13
Ohio St J on Disp Res 711, 714, 716 (1998) (advocating the use of “Self
Regulatory Mechanisms [to] Promote a Cyber-Usage of Trade,” because, “[i]n
the age of mature electronic commercial transactions, parties must be able to
rely on custom and usage of trade”).
6
See William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (1973).
See also, Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 Stan L Rev 621, 624 (“Llewellyn saw law as an
articulation and regularization of unconsciously evolved mores—a
crystallization of a generally recognized and almost indisputably right rule (a
‘singing reason’), inherent in, but very possibly obscured by, existing patterns
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Academic commentators have long debated the proper role of
7
customary practices in commercial adjudication. They have explored
the difficulty of defining the parameters of the custom to be
8
9
sought, have debated the efficiency of custom, have explored the
10
actual role played by custom in various adjudicatory fora, have
discussed the extent to which custom was absorbed into the
11
common law, and have noted the problems of institutional
competence that might inhibit the accurate determination of the
12
content of customary practices. However, a more basic and
naturally prior question has not been adequately addressed. Namely,
to what extent do the types of industry-specific meanings of words
and the types of unwritten, industry-wide “usages of trade” and
“commercial standards”—that the Code directs courts to incorporate
into commercial agreements through both gap-filling and the
interpretive process—actually exist as to most aspects of contracting

of relationships.”).
7
There is no widely accepted definition of a custom. This essay defines it as
an unwritten practice, which would be considered a usage of trade under the
Code, see UCC § 1-205, or the type of commercial standard that would be
incorporated into a contract or taken into account in the contract interpretation
process under the Code. See note 1. This Article uses the terms trade practice,
usage of trade, and custom interchangeably.
8
See, for example, Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist? in Jody S.
Kraus and Steven D. Walt, eds, The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and
Commercial Law (Cambridge 1999).
9
See, for example, Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms
144 U Pa L Rev 1697 (1996) (providing a host of reasons that norms might
not be efficient); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial
Norms, 26 J Legal Stud 277 (1997) (drawing on a theory of cultural evolution to
argue that customary practices are unlikely to be efficient but may be more
nearly optimal than either individual decisions with respect to particular
transactions or legislative enactments).
10
See, for example, Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms,
Commercial Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration (1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with U Chi L Rev).
11
See, for example, E. Karl McGinnis, Present Legal and Practical Methods
by which Business Custom is Enforced, 5 NC L Rev 136 (1927) (discussing
various ways of “enforcing” custom including trade association arbitration and
incorporation into the common law).
12
See, for example, Randy E. Barnett, The Sounds of Silence: Default Rulees
and Contractual Consent, 78 Va L Rev 821, 901 n 231 (noting that while
“judges may be good surrogates for the rationally ignorant consumer, they are
often deficient interpreters of more specialized usages of trade.”).

5
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relationships in merchant communities?
13

13

The Code was assumed to be based on a solid empirical foundation.
William A. Schnader, a primary mover behind the Code project, chose Karl
Llewellyn as Chief Reporter because
Not only was Professor Llewellyn a student of commercial law as it
appeared in the law books, but he was the type of law professor who was
never satisfied unless he knew exactly how commercial transactions were
carried on in the market place. He insisted that the provisions of the Code
should be drafted from the standpoint of what actually takes place from day
to day in the commercial world rather than from the standpoint of what
appeared in statutes and decisions.
William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U Miami L Rev 1, 14 (1967) (UCC
Symposium). However, with the exception of seeking (and then ignoring) the
opinions of merchants in hearings on the Code (see note 144 and
accompanying text), rigorous empirical research into what types of rules would
actually be responsive to merchant concerns was never undertaken. While
Llewellyn’s defenders recognize that the lack of an empirical basis for the Code
was inconsistent with his realist and scientific approach to law as well as his
often-expressed position that in drafting a commercial code attention should be
paid to the “wide basis of established commercial experience,” Twining, Karl
Llewellyn at 524 (cited in note 6), they are quick to point out that “critics who
have been suspicious of Llewellyn’s alleged ‘unscientific,’ impressionistic,’ or
‘anecdotal’ approach to facts have yet to point to any major factual assumptions
of the Code that were misleading or inaccurate. Nor have suggestions been
forthcoming as to specific empirical research that might have been worth
doing.” Id at 319. See also the comment of Robert Summers in id at 467 (“I
think the biggest and best reason for lack of empirical research is this: most of
the law is “suppletive” law—it applies only when the parties have not agreed as
to the matter in hand. It says what the law is when the parties don’t say.”).
This Article, together with earlier work on other industries, see Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U Pa L Rev 1765 (1996), and Lisa Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation Through Rules,
Norms, and Institutions (Sept 8, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with U
Chi L Rev), suggests that the lack of solid empirical research led Code drafters
to adopt provisions that are detrimental rather than accommodating to
merchant concerns, and to a commercial law based on a deeply flawed
understanding of merchant reality.
It should be noted that Llewellyn was aware of the sources discussed in this
Article. In a memorandum he presented in defense of the proposed Code’s
battle of the forms provision, UCC § 2-207, he cited the existence of similar
provisions in merchant trade rules in support of his position; yet when these
sources did not support the position he was advocating, Llewellyn neglected to
mention them. K.N. Llewellyn, Memorandum by K.N. Llewellyn Replying to the
Report and Memorandum of Task Group 1 of the Special Committee of the
Commerce and Industry Association of New York, Inc., on the Uniform Commercial
Code, in Study of Uniform Commercial Code Memoranda presented to the
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Starting from the generally accepted premise that unwritten
commercial customs are most likely to arise and endure in situations
where transactors interact on a repeat basis, over a long period of
14
time, in relatively similar transactions, this Article addresses the
15
question from a largely empirical perspective. In keeping with
Commission and Stenographic Report of Public Hearing on Article 2 of the Code 42,
56-57 (1954), reprinted in State of New York, 1 Report of the Law Revision
Commission for 1954 and Record of Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code 106,
121 (Williams 1954). In addition, Llewellyn’s early writings show that he was
aware of the existence of these private legal systems. See, for example, Karl N.
Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 American Econ
Rev 665, 672, 673 n 24 (1925) (“Increasingly, associations are forming which
adopt their own rules of action and even settle their own disputes . . . . And
the rules which . . . such associations lay down and apply, are part of the body
of our law . . . . [T]he association-made rules are like enough to law to deserve
careful attention.”).
14
These preconditions for the emergence of custom are widely accepted.
Several additional factors, such as that the transactors play reciprocal roles i n
the transaction (in the commercial law setting this means that they are buyers
one day and sellers the next), and that most transactions are among members of
an ethnically homogeneous or geographically concentrated small group, are said
to make the emergence of custom more likely but are not strictly required. For
endorsements of these criteria, see Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J.
Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J Legal Stud 1,
11-16 (1992) (“[T]he key variables on the emergence of custom seem to be the
symmetry of results and the frequency of the dispute with the question of
severity of the loss playing a secondary role.”); Bruce L. Benson, Customary
Law as a Social Contract: International Commercial Law, 3 Const Pol Econ 1, 7
(1992) (endorsing these criteria as corresponding to the game theoretic
conditions for the emergence of commercial custom and cooperation). See also
Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
(Harvard 1991). Although the merchant industries discussed in this essay do
not perfectly fulfill the conditions theorists identify as being ideal for the
emergence of custom, they come far closer to doing so than most contemporary
industries whose disputes are adjudicated under the Code’s merchant rules.
15
Most commentators simply assert or assume the existence of custom. See,
for example, Berman and Drassler, at 28, 32 (cited in note 3) (“Yet, that should
not stop us from seeing what is right in front of our noses! It is the factual
existence of international custom and its continuous use . . . that allows us to
speak of international trade as a special type of international law. Nobody
denies that there is a body of international rules, founded on the commercial
understandings and contract practices of an international community
principally composed of mercantile, shipping, insurance, and banking
enterprises of all countries.”); id at 25 (“[C]ustomary commercial
understandings enjoy almost total recognition . . . [notwithstanding the fact
that] [s]uch rules may not be very conspicuous and may easily be overlooked by
scholars.”). The only notable exceptions are Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A .
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Llewellyn’s view that commercial law should reflect merchant
16
reality, it identifies several merchant industries—hay, grain and
feed, textiles, and silk—that in an early stage of their development
were roughly characterized by conditions favorable to the emergence
of customs. It then explores the attempts of national trade
associations in these industries to codify their industries’ customs
into written trade rules.
The debates surrounding these codification efforts suggest that
there was not widespread agreement among merchants as to either
the meaning of common terms of trade or the content of many
basic commercial practices. Rules committee debates sometimes
went on for years, customs relating to important aspects of
transactions were left uncodified because consensus could not be
achieved, and in most industries drafting committees eventually
engaged in only selective codification. In addition, over time, many
associations came to explicitly concede that they were attempting to
Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U Chi L Rev XX (1999)
(drawing on game theoretic models and fact-based case studies to suggest that
customary international law does not exist); Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?
at XX (cited in note 8) (questioning whether trade customs can be given content
by adjudicators independent of “the goals, beliefs and other normative premises
of the person doing the identifying,” and concluding that they cannot because
the problems faced by a court “finding” the content of a custom are analytically
similar to the problems faced by a court trying to find the content of the
common law”). See also Leon E. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of
Commercial Law 45-60 (Fred B. Rothman 1983) (attempting to empirically
establish the existence of custom in international oil contracts); but see Chris
Williams, Book Review, The Search for Bases of Decision in Commercial Law:
Llewellyn Redux, 97 Harv L Rev 1495, 1501-04 (1984) (arguing that
Trakman’s evidence does not establish the existence of custom).
16
See, for example, Walter D. Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6
Bus Law 113, 126 (1951) (quoting the Report of the Committee on the
Proposed Commercial Code: “the practices of businessmen and business houses
are important factors in construing their contracts and actions and i n
determining their rights and liabilities . . . [M]any of the changes effected by
the Code are designed to adapt rules of law to the way that business is actually
carried on”) (emphasis in original). See also National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Report and Second Draft: The Revised
Uniform Sales Act 253-54 (1941) (noting, in a comment thought to have been
drafted by Llewellyn, that while “the law about the effect of ‘business custom’ is
quite . . . uncertain . . . that has not been because any sane court for half-acentury doubted the wisdom of fully incorporating the relevant usage into the
agreement and into the adequacy of performance.”).
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change rather than merely incorporate existing practices.
These findings, together with interview evidence and the
testimony of merchant associations on the proposed commercial
Code, suggest that “usages of trade” and “commercial standards,” as
those terms are used by the Code, may not consistently exist, even in
relatively close-knit merchant communities. While merchants in the
industries examined here sometimes do and did act in ways
amounting to loose behavioral regularities, most such regularities are
either much more geographically local in nature or far more general
17
in scope and conditional in form than is commonly assumed.
These industries’ efforts at codification, and the subsequent
operation of modern merchant-run private legal systems, also suggest
that merchants differentiate between written and unwritten
customs and that their understanding of customary practices is both
different from and far more nuanced than Llewellyn’s.
The understanding of merchant reality gained by looking at
these codification debates, together with other merchant-related
sources, suggests that, given the Code’s flawed empirical basis, it may
be time to reconceptualize the role played by custom in commercial
transactions and to rethink the wisdom of the Code’s incorporation18
based approach to gap-filling and contract interpretation, an
approach that is endorsed and strengthened in current drafts of
17

Although commentators have long recognized local differences i n
customary practices, many have dismissed them as trivial without providing
any supporting examples. See Benson, Customary Law at 15 & n 9 (cited i n
note 14) (arguing that the law merchant protected merchants, “against the
vagaries of local laws and customs,” thereby recognizing the existence of these
differences, but dismissing them as “reflect[ing only] differential preferences
for relatively minor variations and commercial practices and institutions”).
18
Merchant tribunals’ rejection of the incorporation strategy does not
necessarily undermine the “situation sense” component of Llewellyn’s
jurisprudence. See generally James Whitman, Commercial Law and the
American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn’s German Sources for the Uniform Commercial
Code, 97 Yale L J 156 (1987) (describing the origins and content of Llewellyn’s
notion of “situation sense”). The opinions produced by merchant tribunals
reveal that arbitrators’ background knowledge of the trade may enable them to
better assess the credibility of testimony and may give them a better
understanding of the types of evidence that ought to be submitted. Because most
merchant legal systems authorize arbitrators to request additional information
in lieu of giving the parties a right of discovery, arbitrators’ background
understanding of transactional practices should enable them to intelligently
exercise this authority.

9
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19

proposed revisions to the Code, drafts that represent the
undeserved triumph of legal realism in commercial law.
To this end, this Article proposes an alternative conception of
the types of customs and practices that do exist and the role they play
in commercial relationships. It suggests that while the types of
generally agreed upon practices that Llewellyn thought merchants
viewed as supplying implicit contract provisions do not consistently
exist, merchants do consider it valuable to have an understanding of
the ways transactions are usually done, an understanding gleaned
from a rough aggregation of practices in the market as a whole. It
then argues that these types of understandings, which this Article
refers to as weak-form customs, provide transactors with a pool of
common knowledge that in the early stages of their contracting
relationship enables them to better assess whether the other
transactor is a cooperator or a defector, thereby facilitating the
emergence and maintenance of repeat-dealing cooperative
contracting relationships. On this view, weak-form customs, which
are different from the strong-form Hayekian customs whose
20
existence is assumed by the code, can be understood as providing
transactors with a set of vaguely defined yet workable relationshipcreating norms that initially add tremendous value to contracting
relationships but that gradually diminish in importance as
contracting relationships mature.
Part I of this Article looks at several associations’ attempts to
codify custom and discusses the methodological limitations of
19

See Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, PEB
Study Group, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2: Preliminary Report 16-17
(1990) (after reviewing the present Code’s incorporation strategy and its use of
open-ended terms like “reasonable” and “seasonable,” the Study Group
“endorses the drafting style utilized in Article 2 and recommends that the
general sales policies . . . be retained . . . . We recommend that the Drafting
Committee consider ways beyond those recommended by the Study Group to
articulate these policies and to improve their implementation. The objective is
to achieve a more complete utilization of them by the parties and the courts i n
the resolution of commercial disputes.”). See also id at 9, 32 (emphasizing that
the Code’s provision on course of dealing and usage of trade “is a crucial
component of the [Code’s] broad definition of agreement,” and recommending
that the section on course of performance or practical construction be moved to
Article 1, because “[t]his important principle of interpretation should not be
limited to contracts for the sale of goods”).
20
See notes XX-YY and accompanying text.
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drawing conclusions from the codification debates. Part II briefly
revisits and critiques the justifications that have been developed for
the incorporation strategy. Part III proposes a theory of the
relationship-creating role played by weak-form customs in
commercial transactions. It then provides suggestive, though not
conclusive, evidence that it is both a plausible and analytically useful
account of merchant interactions. Part IV concludes that while
some industry-wide usages of trade do exist, and highly local customs
might have existed, the pervasive existence of usages of trade and
commercial standards, whose geographic reach is coextensive with
the reach of the relevant trade, is a legal fiction rather than a
merchant reality. It therefore suggests that new justifications for the
Code’s interpretive approach and gap-filling methodology are
needed.
I. TR AD E ASSO CI ATIONS’ ATTEMP TS TO CODIFY CUST OM
Between 1860 and the mid-1900’s, a period during which many
merchant industries had already become significantly national in
scope, numerous national trade associations created private
arbitration tribunals and soon thereafter began to codify industry
21
practices into written trade rules. These rules typically state that
22
they are either codifications or selective codifications of industry
23
customs, or attempts either to clarify, or to achieve uniformity in,
21

For an overview of the operation of these private legal systems that
includes a discussion of their substantive rules, adjudicative procedures, and
adjudicative approaches, see Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, in Peter
Newman, ed, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Stockton
1998).
22
See, for example, The American Yarn Spinners Association, Inc.
(AYSA), The Yarn Rules of 1989 Introduction (AYSA 1989) (“For more than
fifty years, members of the Yarn industry have utilized industry rules regarding
contract terms and conditions and industry norms for the sale of yarns. The
Yarn Rules have been used as a statement of trade practice and from time to
time have been revised to reflect developments in the industry over the years.
The Yarn Rules and the customary contract terms are recommended to serve as
a reference to members of the yarn industry of trade practices commonly in use
throughout the industry.”).
23
See, for example, Rubber Trade Association of New York, Inc., General
Rules, Prefatory Note (revised 1978) (“The compilation is the result of a study
of the usages and customs that have developed in the trade and, in the opinion
of the Association, is representative of those terms and conditions of sale

11
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24

industry practices. The preambles to many sets of trade rules
explicitly state that their goal is to reduce the number of commercial
misunderstandings that arise by clarifying the scope and content of
25
contractual obligations. In most industries, these trade rules
provide a detailed set of contract default rules covering most aspects
of contract formation, performance, and breach.
In most associations, trade rules are drafted and subsequently
amended by committees of experienced industry members who serve
without compensation and are either appointed by the board of
directors or directly elected by the membership. In many industries,
both the original rules and subsequent amendments are subject to
26
floor debate at the associations’ annual conventions and must be
27
approved by a specified percentage of the membership as a whole.
which will eliminate misunderstandings between buyer and seller.”).
24
See, for example, American Fats and Oils Association, Inc, By-Laws,
Art I, “Purpose,” reprinted in American Fats and Oils Association, Inc,
Trading and Arbitration Rules, Bylaws, Roster (1994) (“to work toward
uniformity and certainty in . . . the customs and usages of the trade”);
Association of Food Industries, Inc., Fact Sheet “Objectives” (no publication
date) (“To seek uniformity and certainty in the customs and usage of the
trade.”); The Cocoa Merchants’ Association of America, Inc., By-Laws, Art II,
“Purpose” (revised Oct 29, 1993) (“to procure uniformity and certainty in the
customs and usage of the trade”); Charter and By-Laws of the Greenwood Cotton
Exchanges, Charter No 7 (1957) (“to establish . . . uniform usages, rules and
regulations.”); Charter Constitution and By-Laws of the Memphis Cotton Exchange
5 (1992) (“to maintain uniformity in its rules, regulations and usages”);
American Seed Trade Association (“ASTA”), Bylaws, Art I, “Purposes” (as
amended Apr 15, 1989) (to “assist in the promulgation of trade rules, practices
and customs for those engaged in the industry”); Association of Crafts and
Creative Industries, Bylaws, Art II, “Objectives,” §§ 1-2 (1994) (to “foster
equity and business usages . . . in furtherance of these purposes . . . the
Association shall have power . . . to advance lawful and fair trade practices,
customs and usages”).
25
See, for example, American Peanut Shellers Association, Official Trading
Rules: Farmers Stock, Domestic and Export 2 (May 1994) (noting that the rules
were adopted to “make more definite the terms of contracts of purchase and
sale”). See also note 33.
26
See, for example, NHA, Report of the Twelfth Annual Convention (1905)
(reporting verbatim debates). Other associations mail copies of proposed
changes to their members or print proposed changes in trade publications.
27
\* MERGEFORMAT \* MERGEFORMAT \* MERGEFORMAT
\* MERGEFORMAT Many by-laws give each member firm (regardless of its
size) one vote on proposed trade rules. At the National Grain and Feed
Association, trade rules may be temporarily amended by a vote of two-thirds of
the Board of Directors, Bylaws of the NGFA, Art XVII § 2, reprinted i n
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This section explores the efforts of trade associations in core
merchant industries to codify their commercial customs into trade
rules. It finds that, contrary to the assumptions of the Code drafters,
even in close-knit communities, merchant transactors do not, except
28
within very local spheres or in very general ways, have similar views
about the meaning of common contractual terms or the content of
precisely those types of commercial standards and usages of trade
that the Code and its Official Comments direct courts to take into
account in deciding cases.
A. Hay
29
The National Hay Association (“NHA”) was formed in
30
31
1895. It began arbitrating cases in 1899 and adopted its first set
NGFA, NGFA Trading and Trade Rules Seminar (1994) (no pagination i n
original), subject to “an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the voting power
present at the next annual meeting of the members,” id at § 2 (see also id at §
3), with each “Active member and each Affiliated member . . . entitled to one
vote,” id at Art IV, § 1 (see also § 2). In associations with this voting
structure, even if large firms control the rules committees, it will be difficult for
them to secure passage of rules that are greatly biased in their direction. On the
other hand, if they do control most committees, small firms would have a hard
time even getting the rules they might want onto the agenda. It is, however,
important to note that in some associations, proposed rules and rules
amendments must be approved by a sellers’ group and a buyers’ group. See, for
example, American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. (“ATMI”) and
American Cotton Shippers Association (“ACSA”), The Southern Mill Rules for
Buying and Selling of American Cotton 32 (ATMI & ACSA 1995) (requiring the
approval of members of the ACSA and the ATMI).
Most Bylaws provide for annual review of the trade rules, but the actual
frequency of rule amendments varies widely. See NGFA, Trade Rules and
Arbitration Rules (pamphlet) (1995) (noting that the Grain Rules were amended
59 times and the Feed Rules 33 times); see also note 84 (Worth Street Rules)
and notes 114, 118, 120 (silk rules).
28
In the context of the incorporation debates, there are also reasons to be
skeptical about strong statements suggesting that local customs exist. If, for
example, a transactor is arguing for adoption of a particular rule (especially one
that is favorable to his locality rather than simply to a subset of firms in it), he
might invoke the alleged universality of the practice in his locality to give his
argument legitimacy and persuasive force.
29
The NHA is “made up of producers, dealers, brokers and representatives
of related industry . . . . [It] is dedicated to the development and maintenance
of better quality hay and improved marketing practices.” NHA, National Hay
Association (Association brochure mailed to author in 1997).
30
At the time the NHA was formed, the interstate trade in hay was fairly
well established, having begun in the 1840’s. See William J. Reinke,
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32

of trade rules in 1907, after two years of work on the project. The
goal of the rules creation process was not to memorialize already
uniform customary practices, but rather to prevent disputes by
33
actively promoting uniformity. Prior to the adoption of the rules:
[P]acking, shipping and handling hay was an irregular business.
There were no established customs to govern, and every
transaction was typical of the parties engaged in it. Balers and
shippers followed the bent of their own inclination in the
details of baling, weighing, buying and shipping, and
distributing markets also points of consumption, were under
local influences and often dominated by whimsical notions, and
at the same point of shipment, or in the same receiving market
34
there was irregularity of method or consistency in business.
Arbitration in the National Hay Association 2 (1955) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Chicago, on file with the University of Chicago
Libraries) (“The shipment and marketing of hay is reported to have originated
in the 1840’s.”).
31
In 1897, a bylaw amendment to provide for arbitration was proposed and
apparently was adopted. NHA, Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting 46 (1897).
Full Association records from 1898 to 1900 are unavailable, but the amendment
appears in the 1901 Constitution and By-Laws, see Art XIV(2), reprinted i n
NHA, Report of the Eighth Annual Meeting 48 (1901), and the 1899 Report
contains a lament that the “Committee on Arbitration and Investigation has
little power,” suggesting that the arbitration amendment had been adopted.
NHA, Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting 185 (1899). Prior to the Arbitration
Committee, the Association created an Investigation Committee empowered to
investigate and sanction instances of “uncommercial conduct.” NHA,
Constitution and By-Laws, Art X, reprinted in NHA, Report of the Second Annual
Meeting 32 (1895). The work of this committee continued even after the
arbitration committee was formed.
32
NHA, Report of the Eleventh Annual Convention 34-35 (1905).
33
See NHA, Report of the Thirteenth Annual Convention 170 (1906)
(“[D]isputes are more apt to arise, owing to misunderstandings than to
anything else. I think a majority of the people mean to do right, but
misunderstandings will creep in. Therefore it seems very important that this
Association should have trade rules.”). See also NHA, Constitution and ByLaws, “Preamble,” reprinted in NHA, Report of the Second Annual Meeting 29
(1895) (declaring that a goal of the association is to “use our best efforts to have
established and maintained uniformity in commercial usages and in the grades
of hay and straw in the different markets of the country”); NHA, Constitution,
“Preamble,” in NHA, Report of the Eighth Annual Meeting 42 (1901)
(reaffirming the Association’s commitment “to use our best efforts to have
established and maintained uniformity in commercial usage”).
34
NHA, Report of the Eighteenth Annual Convention 3 (1911).
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In fact, hay transactors were not even able to agree on the meaning
of trade terms as basic as “bale” and “No. 1 Hay.” As one industry
participant noted:
What is a bale of No. 1 hay? There is not a man in this room
can tell you. Put twenty bales of different grades of hay along
that room, and there will not be five men among you who will
agree. You have decided that a ton of No. 1 hay may contain
not over one fifth of tame grasses. A gentlemen spoke up and
said as his opinion that tame grass is clover. If you know
anything, you know that a bale of hay with one-fifth clover is
35
clovery mixed hay. No. 1 hay should be pure timothy.
And, as another observed:
The large bales of New York and New England means a
different bale from the large bale in the Western States, and
the same is true of the small bales. In Chicago at present there
36
is a lack of clear definition of small bales.
35

NHA, Report of the Fourth Annual Convention 40 (1897). See also NHA,
Report of the Twelfth Annual Convention 37 (1905) (“Grades cannot be expected
to suit the South, North, East and West with the same degree of satisfaction.”);
NHA, Report of the Eighteenth Annual Convention 154 (1911) (“The hay trade of
this country will not be on a sound basis, on an honest basis, until No. 1 hay
is No. 1 hay East, West, North, and South.”); NHA, Report of the TwentySeventh Annual Convention 54 (1920) (“[T]here is at present no uniform grade
or at least no uniformly interpreted grade that can be used as a medium for
making sales or purchases of hay in territories remote from each other. What is
considered as No. 1 timothy, for example, in one producing section may be
considered as No. 2 timothy in another producing section, and still of another
grade in the consuming section to which it may be shipped.”). Disputes over
grade were not due merely to subjective disagreements about quality
assessments, but rather were due, in part, to the fact that different markets
defined the same grade differently. NHA, Twenty-Seventh Annual Convention at
74-77 (comparing the grading requirements of eleven sets of association and
exchange grading rules and finding wide differences); NHA, Report of the
Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention 70-75 (1921) (recounting a long debate as to
whether “Choice” hay or No. 1 hay is the highest grade, with some
participants questioning whether “Choice” was even a recognized grade
designation).
36
NHA, Report of the Tenth Annual Convention 76 (1903). See also id at 80
(“[B]ales are not governed by size so much as by weight in the Northwest. In
Chicago, I know, they like light bales, weighing from eighty-five to ninetyfive pounds; and in the East they like heavier bales. In Wisconsin they will
put in 125 to 135 pounds, and that makes a pretty heavy bale.”); NHA, Report
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The debates surrounding the adoption and amendment of the
hay rules also suggest that there were no agreed upon usages in
relation to some of the precise aspects of a standard transaction that
the Code and its Official Comments explicitly direct courts to
discern by reference to usage of trade or commercial standards.
For example, the Code provides that when the time for “delivery
or any other action under a contract” is not specified, it “shall be a
37
reasonable time,” determined by reference to “commercial
38
standards,” “acceptable commercial conduct” and “usage of trade.”
However, the debate over a proposed rule, which would determine
when certain freight charges had to be requested, reveals that there
39
was no agreement as to what a reasonable time might be. As one
participant opined, “that ‘reasonable time’ business will not tell
40
anything. You might as well leave it out.” And, in response to a
of the Fourteenth Annual Convention 72 (1907) (“[T]here is no general definition
of the terms as a Small Bale in one section may mean a Medium Bale i n
another, or a Medium Bale a Small Bale in another, a Medium Bale a Large
Bale in another and so on.”). The causes of this disagreement were partly
technological since different hay baling machines produced different size bales
of hay. Similar disagreements existed in other industries. See, for example,
ASTA, ASTA Yearbook 59 (1914) (“Seedsmen handle large quantities of . . .
seeds . . . for few of which legal weights per bushel have been established.
They have, therefore, to arrive at customary weights only, which vary in the
different States.”) (emphasis added). The weight associated with the designation
“bale” in the silk industry also varied from country to country. See Revision of
Raw Silk Rules Completed, 3 Silkworm 76 (May 1921).
37
UCC § 2-309.
38
Id at § 2-309 cmt 1. See, for example, Superior Boiler Works v R.J.
Sanders, Inc, 711 A2d 628 (1998) (“In the usual case the question of what
constitutes a reasonable time under the UCC is one for the finder of fact to
determine from . . . [several factors, including] usage of trade in the pertinent
industry.”); James Town Terminal Elevator, 246 NW2d 736, 740 (ND 1976)
(holding that “based on the previous ‘course of dealing’ of the parties and the
industry’s ‘usage of trade,’ the jury could determine that Aug. 31, 1973, was a
reasonable time for delivery”).
39
See also, NHA, Report of the Sixteenth Annual Convention 220 (1909)
(observing that “[t]he word ‘ample’ [as used in a rule requiring “ample
margin”] may not have the same meaning in the minds of different people”);
NHA, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention 68 (1921) (“You will see
at the end of each paragraph ‘well baled.’ That term is so indefinite . . . .
[T]here should be something more definite brought into it.”); id (“I think the
words ‘good color’ might be stricken out and insert something which the
inspector or shipper or buyer will know what it means.”).
40
NHA, Report of the Sixteenth Annual Convention 222-23 (1909).
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suggestion that a more definite rule be adopted, one transactor
proposed “nine months,” another “fifteen days,” and still another,
41
“within ten days after the freight bills have been paid.”
Prior to adoption of the rules, there was also widespread
disagreement about the meaning of the type of common contractual
language that the Code and its Official Comments direct courts to
interpret “as meaning what it may fairly be expected to mean to
parties,” which is determined, in part, by looking to “usage of trade
42
as a factor in reaching the commercial meaning.” For example,
while hay contracts tended to include delivery-time provisions like
“prompt” or “immediate,” provisions the Code would look to usage
43
44
to define, there was no consensus as to what those terms meant.
41
Id. Only one participant spoke in favor of the reasonable time proposal,
saying “if it requires fifteen days in their market that is a reasonable time for
them. If it can be done in three days in another place that is a reasonable time
in their market. I think anyone can readily form an opinion of what reasonable
time is.” Id.
42
UCC § 1-205 cmt 4. See also id at § 1-205 cmt 1 (“This Act rejects both
the ‘lay dictionary’ and the ‘coveyancer’s’ reading of a commercial agreement.
Instead the meaning of the agreement of the parties is to be determined by the
language used by them and by their action, read and interpreted in light of
commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances.”).
43
See, for example, Kreglinger & Fernau v Charles J. Webb Co, 162 F Supp
695, 697 (1957), affd, 255 F2d 680 (3d Cir 1958) (noting that the “whole
controversy centers around the single question, What did the parties intend
when they inserted the world ‘prompt’ in the contract?” the court looked to
trade usage to define “prompt” but concluded that no usage existed, “because the
plaintiff contends it meant ‘by first available ship’ and defendant that it meant
thirty days”).
44
See NHA, Report of the Twelfth Annual Convention 155 (1905) (quoting a
member as stating: “Suppose . . . I should purchase of a shipper a carload of
hay for prompt shipment. Technically that means nothing. It does mean
something if I purchase a car of oats on the . . . floor” of an official exchange
with written trade rules (emphasis added). Similarly, the Code defines a
“Commercial unit,” in terms of “commercial usage,” explicitly noting that it
may be defined in terms of “a quantity [such as] a bale . . . or carload.” UCC §
2-105(6). However, in the hay industry there was no accepted meaning of
either “bale” or “carload.” In 1905, in a debate over whether trade rules should
be adopted, one participant noted that “it is a very grave question of doubt i n
any state what is meant by the shipment of ten cars,” NHA, Report of the
Twelfth Annual Convention 156 (1903). And, in 1910, the Arbitration
Committee decided to “respectfully recommend that [the NHA] establish a rule
to be added to our Trade Rules in which the number of tons of hay is specified
that shall constitute a contract carload.” NHA, Report of the Seventeenth Annual
Convention 67 (1910), but the issue was not fully debated until 1921. NHA,
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This lack of consensus led to many misunderstandings. The trade
rules were conceived of as a way to avoid such misunderstandings by
providing “a sort of dictionary to which all the members of this
45
Association can go.”
The hay industry codification debates also suggest that some of
the Code rules relating to the formation of contracts that rely on
trade usage and commercial standards for their substance may be
problematic. For example, while the Code directs courts to look to
46
“commercial standards on the point of ‘indefiniteness’” in
determining whether an agreement is sufficiently definite to be
enforced. However, hay arbitrators, like merchant arbitrators in
47
many industries, routinely point out that contracts ought to be far
more detailed than they are and frequently chastise parties for
48
entering into unduly vague agreements.
Report of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention 85 (1921) (recounting the debate
over the meaning of the term “carload,” with some people saying it meant “10
tons” and others asserting “12 tons”). See note 69 and accompanying text.
45
NHA, Report of the Twelfth Annual Convention, 155 (1905).
46
UCC § 2-204 cmt.
47
See, for example, Hinson v Parker Parker Grain Co, Arbitration Case No
1628 (Dec 23, 1986) (“[T]he arbitration panel was unanimous in wishing to
caution the trade as to the necessity of using well-thought-out contracts that
clearly encompass all of the obligations of both buyers and seller to each
other.”); ASTA, ASTA Yearbook 164 (1927) (“Counsel has rarely, if ever seen
a so-called business-man’s contract which was not shy of some desirable
provision.”).
48
H.H. Driggs v Walters Bros, in NHA, Report of the Eleventh Annual
Convention 145-46 (1905) (“[W]e find many of the terms of a contract of this
kind ambiguous and indefinite.”); NHA Committee on Arbitration, Case 676,
in NHA, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention 140, 141 (1921)
(“This controversy arises principally because plaintiff’s confirmation in regard
to time of shipment was indefinite, and further defendants also exercised gross
carelessness in respect to confirmation in accordance with custom and trade
rules.”); NHA, Report of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Convention 108 (1922) (“We
[the Arbitration Committee] are impressed that in most all cases trouble arises
from the fact that contracts are carelessly made and too much is taken for
granted by the contracting parties. It might be well to adopt a slogan, ‘Take
nothing for granted.’ Both parties to a contract should file written
confirmation, clearly defining all specifications and details governing said
contract. All modifications should also be confirmed in writing and many cases
for arbitration would be eliminated.”); NHA, Report of the Thirtieth Annual
Convention 59, 61 (1923) (where the arbitration committee notes: “there is one
suggestion I would like to leave with you and it is this—in making your sales
and purchases pay more attention to trade rules No. 1 [setting out what a
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Despite these disagreements over the content of general usages
and the meaning of common contractual language, a few general
49
usages may have existed, and local pockets of customary practice
were not uncommon. Many rule adoption and amendment debates,
such as those relating to grading and inspection, took the form of
50
debates among representatives of regions and localities, each with
51
their own practices. In some localities these customs took the form
contract should specify] and No. 2 [dealing with sending confirmations] . . . .
Make definite contracts and observe your trade rules, and when this is done
membership in The National Hay Association will be a real asset to your
individual business.”); NHA, Report of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention 131
(1918) (noting “the fact that 75% of the cases which come before this
[Arbitration] Committee would be avoided if contracts were made definite as to
the time of shipment, grade, weights, and proper confirmations mailed by both
parties”); NHA, Report of the Seventeenth Annual Convention 48 (1910) (where
the arbitration committee attributes the rising number of cases to the use of
“poor and faulty contract[s],” and recommends the adoption of an associationdrafted “uniform explicit and binding contract for the use of its members.”).
49
For example, in most cash commodities industries, price adjustments
were often given for slightly nonconforming tender. See, for example, Jones v
Henderson (NGFA 1904), reprinted in NGFA, Decisions of the Arbitration and
Appeals Committees of the Grain Dealers National Association 23 (1920) (In a
dispute over rejection of an off grade delivery of corn, the arbitrators held that
while “custom has held that where off grade grain is shipped, discounts may
often permit contracts to be filled by applying such cars or quantities that are
not equal to contract grade to be applied on contract at a difference. But there is
no rule in the grain trade making it obligatory on the purchaser to accept lower
grades of grain.”).
50
While some of the practices so debated had distributional consequences,
others such as how to define the quality associated with each grade
designation—see, for example, NHA, Report of the Twenty-Seventh Annual
Convention 74 (1920) (comparing grade rules of 11 sets of exchange
rules)—related to routine matters where only coordination was important but
transactors nonetheless fought for their preferred definitions. See NHA,
Report of the Twentieth Annual Convention 46-50 (1913) (debating grade
changes). Similar obstinance was exhibited in the grain industry. See 17 Who is
Who in the Grain Trade (“WWGT”) 31, 33 (Jan 5, 1927-28) (after noting that
many local rules relating to shipping time contradicted the Grain Dealers
National Rules, the chairman of the Trade Rules Committee stated that: “in
taking the matter up with the markets that differ we find on a whole that they
are very conservative and tenacious in maintaining their rules but we are
working on the question and gradually obtaining results”).
51
See for example, NHA, Report of the Fourth Annual Convention 24-25
(1897) (“[W]e are old fashioned folks at Boston, and this Association must not
forget one thing, that what is applicable to one section of the country is not
applicable to another”); NHA, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention
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of unwritten practices, while in others they were codified in the
rules of local hay associations or commodities exchanges.
More generally, much of the impetus for both codification and
rule amendments came from members of the NHA’s arbitration
52
committee who sought clearer guidance about how to decide cases.
Although hay arbitrators took unwritten custom into account in
filling gaps, they often did so with some reluctance and the industry
53
itself had a strong preference for clear and bright-line rules.
B. Grain and Feed
54
The National
Grain and Feed Association (“NGFA”) was
55
56
formed in 1896 and began arbitrating disputes shortly thereafter.
It adopted the first Grain Trade Rules in 1902 and the first Feed
68-72 (1921) (containing a debate over grades that emphasizes the existence of
regional differences).
52
NHA, Report of the Twelfth Annual Convention 154 (1905) (“We wished
to recommend the adoption of trade rules. We think it necessary for this
Association to have trade rules printed. It would simplify the work of the
Arbitration Committee and would make less work for that committee to do.”).
53
NHA, Report of the Twelfth Annual Convention 74 (1905) (“We should
always keep in mind the benefits which associations like the Chicago Board of
Trade and the New York Stock Exchange confer on their members, are due to
their rigid rules, the basis of which is business integrity and mutual interest.”).
54
The NGFA, formerly the Grain Dealers National Association, is a trade
association “for the North American grain and feed industry.” Today, it has
“more than 1,100 [member] companies . . . that store, handle, merchandize
and process more than two-thirds of all U.S. grains.” David C. Barrett, Jr.,
Arbitrating Agricultural Disputes: The National Grain and Feed Association’s
Experience 1-2, reprinted in NGFA, NGFA Trading Seminar (no pagination i n
original) (cited in note 27). For a more detailed description of the industry’s
contemporary private legal system, see Lisa Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at
1771-87 (cited in note 13).
55
Cross country trade in grain was already common by the 1840’s and
accelerated quickly after the growth of railroads in 1898. William Cronon,
Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West, ch 3 (1991). Many grain traders
were buyers one day and sellers the next, whereas in feed markets many
transactions were between merchant sellers and end users.
56
However, the first written arbitration opinion was not issued until 1902.
Randall C. Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance Through Free
Enterprise: A Centennial Observance of the National Grain and Feed Association 53
(NGFA 1996). Prior to this time, numerous local associations had their own
arbitration tribunals. Today, however, in the cash trade, only the Pacific
Northwest Grain Exchange, the Los Angeles Grain Exchange, the Colorado
Grain and Feed Association, and the Texas Grain and Feed Association,
continue to conduct their own arbitrations.
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Trade Rules in 1921. Achieving uniformity of rules and practices
was an important goal of the rule adoption and amendment
57
process.
Prior to the national rules,
the written trade rules of different
58
local markets varied widely, and unwritten customs were non57

President Clement makes Committee Appointments, 10 WWGT 25 (Nov
20, 1920-21) (“After your committee has drafted trade rules and regulations
which have been adopted by your Association, we recommend that your
Association suggest to the various exchanges of this country that they in turn
adopt these same rules and regulations so as to insure uniformity i n
transactions in mill feed.”).
58
Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 49 (cited in note 56)
(“[W]hen the Grain Dealers National Association was founded. . . .each
terminal market and grain exchange operated under its own set of trading rules
and dispute-resolution procedures. Very little consistency existed between the
trading rules of different markets.”). In addition, the rules of local associations
and exchanges were not regarded as necessarily establishing general trade
customs. See, for example, Ewart Grain Co v Wells-Abbott-Nieman Co (Apr 28,
1920), reprinted in NGFA, Decisions of the Arbitrators and Appeals Committees of
the Grain Dealers National Association 316, 317 (1920) (“[T]he rules of various
exchanges which permit second inspection and discount based thereon, are not
an expression of general trade customs and are applicable only at markets which
carry them in their rules.”). The differences in the rules of local markets
persisted even after the promulgation of the national rules, despite numerous
efforts of the national association to promote uniformity. Effort to Unify
Exchange Trade Rules Revived, 13 WWGT 27 (Dec 20, 1924). Some of these
differences were attributed mostly to local dealers attempting to gain advantage.
Are the Association’s Trade Rules in Danger?, 13 WWGT 28, 29 (Feb 20, 192324) (“It is safe to say that in the local rules governing the different boards of
trade there is unnecessary protection for the local members.”). However,
differences also existed over unifying practices with no distributional impact.
See note 23. \* MERGEFORMAT Conflicts over whether a particular
region’s rules and customs should govern a particular transaction were not
uncommon sources of disagreement between transactors in different localities.
See, for example, Trade Rules: Chairman Replies, 13 WWGT 39, 41 (July 5
1922-23) (“While it is true as you state, that the general custom in your market
is to buy on arrival drafts, it is also customary in the Western markets to make
all sales subject to demand drafts unless otherwise specified. Therefore if the
seller in this case was not familiar with the Richmond market and made the
trade in good faith presuming that the Kansas City custom of demand drafts
was understood it might raise a question as to whether there was any contract at
all as there would be no agreement or meeting of the minds on this term of the
contract.”). In addition, the differences in local rules, and the unwillingness of
local markets, associations, and exchanges to change their practices even as to
aspects of trade that had no clear distributional impact, was a frequent subject of
trade press columns. See, for example, 17 WWGT 31, 33 (Jan 5, 1927-28)
(“[U]niformity in the rules is a matter of slow growth as the different markets
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59

uniform even within particular localities. As a grain dealer observed
at the 1901 convention, many grain men “differ in opinion. Their
ideas concerning what should and should not be done under certain
60
conditions varies as much as the markets themselves.” The
divergence in opinion over the content of industry-wide trade
practices was so wide that “a high probability existed that a dispute
61
would arise whenever grain was traded outside local markets.”
More generally, as a transactor noted in a article published before the
rules were drafted:
As the situation now is, there are customs in the grain trade
that are supposed to be established, but the trouble in respect to
them is, they are not fixed, are not understood alike, some
understand them in one way and others in another way, and
62
for that reason, if for no other, [they] cause difficulty.
In response, in part, to this uncertainty, a Grain Trade Rules
Committee was appointed. In 1901 it submitted fourteen
recommendations relating to trade practices that it hoped would “do
much to bring about a more uniform custom, eliminate friction and
foster a better understanding and closer relations between the
63
interior dealer at primary and intermediate markets.” After
are very conservative in making changes in rules of years standing.”) See also
sources cited in note 50.
59
See, for example, Minutes of Meetings: Secretary’s Book 111 (Nov 9, 1896)
(“Secretary’s Book”) (unpublished book of clippings; copies on file with author)
(reporting that the Illinois Grain Dealers’ Association created trade rules, to,
among other things, “establish and maintain uniformity in commercial usages
as far as the grain trade is concerned”).
60
Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 51 (cited in note 56). See
also The President’s Address, in Secretary’s Book at 117-18 (cited in note 59)
(Peavy Address) (“Trade rules and custom will be an interesting subject and
will help to enlighten us in regard to some of the ambiguous rules and customs
now in vogue.”).
61
Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 49 (cited in note 56). In
addition, as an early trade publication explained, “the farther the buyer is from
the seller, the more the need of a careful and distinct understanding, for
reasons well known.” Secretary’s Book at 111 (cited in note 59). Even today, i n
the Texas Feed Trade, transactors pay “much more attention to contract when
you deal with those in other areas.” Statement of Presenter, TGFA Conference
(1999).
62
Secretary’s Book (no pagination in original) (cited in note 59).
63
Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 50 (cited in note 56).
These recommendations dealt with confirmations, time for shipment, billing

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

22

submitting these recommendations, the committee sought
additional time to draft a complete set of rules, explaining that the
“wide area to be covered and the diverse interests to be equally
represented” made its task difficult. It asked the state associations
and local exchanges to “formulate their trade customs into a set of
64
rules governing the transactions,” so that the national committee
would have a basis from which to work.
The first set of grain rules was quite detailed. However, some
aspects of trade were not covered because customs differed
significantly across the country and consensus could not be achieved.
As one trade journal column noted:
I regret that it is not possible to give you a definite rule covering
the case. The Grain and Feed Dealers National Association for
two or three years endeavored to frame a rule which would
cover a condition of this nature, but we found that the customs
vary so largely in different sections of the country and so many
technical questions arose that it was impossible to reach an
65
agreement that would be national in scope.
When the first set of rules was finally introduced, merchants
had many questions about how to interpret them. In response, the
66
Association solicited “Ask the Chairman” letters from members
instructions, shipment, demurrage, sample sale, loading, terms, telegram,
acceptances, surplus shipments, regular market terms, interior shipments and
invoices. Secretary’s Book (no pagination in original) (1901) (cited in note 59).
64
Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 51 (cited in note 56).
65
Chairman Replies, 20 WWGT 31 (Oct 5, 1930-31). See also, Chairman
Replies, 21 WWGT 28 (Dec 5, 1931-32) (“[T]he rules of the Grain and Feed
Dealers National Association cover the broad principles of trading and details
might differ as to the rate of interest, or the custom of charging to a certain
date, in different sections of the country, so we have not attempted to formulate
a rule on this point.”); Harakerson Proposes a Change in the Trade Rules, 14
WWGT 27 (July 5, 1924-25) (“[W]hile a rule [regarding diversion dates] has
been suggested several times, none has been adopted, because it has been
impossible to frame a rules that would meet all conditions or would state the
general principal that would govern all transactions. It follows that each case
would be settled on its merits with due consideration to customs of the trade i n
territory.”).
66
These types of columns were common in the merchant trade press and
typically contained many inquiries about the content of custom. See, for
example, National-American Wholesale Lumber Association,
Inc.
(“NAWLA”), Questions and Answers, North Coast Weekly Letter No 140 (Sept
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and published detailed answers in the Association’s trade journal.
These columns reveal that an inability to agree on the content of
custom was not only a reason for certain gaps in the trade rules, but
was also a common cause of disagreement among transactors.
Even after the NGFA adopted Trade Rules, large variations in
67
the written rules of local associations continued to exist. As the
Chairman of the Trade Rules Committee explained in 1924,
achieving “uniformity in the rules is a matter of slow growth as the
different markets are very conservative in making changes in rules of
68
years standing.”
The grain trade press also confirms that prior to codification
there was no agreement concerning the meaning of many basic
contractual terms. For example, the meaning of the term “carload”
69
led to numerous controversies and questions from industry
70
members. Finally, it was suggested that grain should simply be sold
71
by weight and the designation “carload” abandoned. Eventually a
16, 1924) (“Question: ‘A wholesaler has taken a cash discount on a Final
Settlement sent to us four months after the date of shipment. Is he entitled to
this discount and what is the custom in regard to this?’”; “Question: ‘Where
order is accepted for “85% 10” and longer; balance shorter; usual lengths, well
proportioned’ what does ‘well proportioned’ mean according to present
customs?’”); NAWLA, Questions and Answers, North Coast Weekly Letter No
150 (Nov 25, 1924) (“What is the custom in making final settlements with
mills when the wholesaler has purchased ‘less 5% commission, underweights to
mill to final destination?’”). See also notes __ and ___ (discussing the question
and answer column in the silk industry journal, “The Silkworm”).
67
Are the Associations’s Trade Rules in Danger?, 13 WWGT 28-29 (Feb 20,
1923-24) (extensively discussing differences in practices and rules from locality
to locality).
68
Rules Governing Transactions in Feedstuffs, 14 WWGT 28, 32 (Oct 20,
1924-25).
69
See, for example, Dispute Over Size of Cars: Smith Bros Grain Co v Security
Mill and Feed Co, 10 WWGT 28-29 (Oct 5, 1920-21) (The “claim in this case
arises over the question of the size of cars made applicable on a contract.”).
70
See, for example, Replies of Chairman Watkins, 10 WWGT 38, 40 (Feb
20, 1920-21) (answering what is meant by the term “capacity” car); Replies of
Chairman Watkins, 10 WWGT 42 (Feb 5, 1920-21) (addressing the question
what is meant by the “contents of one 80 capacity car”); Replies of Chairman
Watkins, 11 WWGT 43 (Dec 5, 1921-22) (answering the question “what
constitutes a car load when a sale of grain is made without any reference being
made as to the size of the cars.”).
71
In a particular controversy there is reason to fabricate a dispute relating to
the definition of a carload since the answer may have a key distributional
impact. As one trade article noted, if the market ”has declined . . . you are liable
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rule was adopted defining carload in terms of weight, but even after
its adoption disputes continued to arise and the rule was amended
72
several times. There was also no consensus as to the meaning of
73
particular grades.
Unlike the Grain Trade Rules, the Feed Trade Rules did not
take long to draft once the codification effort began. However, the
need “for uniform rules” had been obvious for years. Prior to
adoption of the rules, trade practices varied widely: “The feed men [ ]
never had uniform rules to govern their transactions . . . there were
many sets of rules in different localities but there was no uniformity.”
74
Although “sporadic efforts were
made from time to time to
75
achieve this most desirable object,” consensus could not be achieved
and the efforts to adopt written trade rules had always failed. Finally,
due to the efforts of a strong-willed man, a Feed Trade Rules
Committee was appointed. It met in intense session for two days
and came up with a draft set of rules. In reporting the work of his
committee to the association as a whole, the committee chairman
did not attempt to give the rules legitimacy by claiming that they
codified custom. Rather, he explicitly acknowledged that they were
the result of compromise, noting that “[w]e succeeded in
to find 60,000 capacity cars. Should the market advance the cars furnished will
be 30,000 capacity.” Secretary’s Book at 50 (cited in note 59).
72
See Trade Rules of the Grain Dealers National Association (1920), reprinted
in 10 WWGT 39-40 (Nov 20, 1920-21) (a carload shall consist of bushels as
follows “Wheat 1.1000’ shelled corn, milo maize, kaffir corn, and feterita,
1,100; ear corn 700 . . . Provided that where the rules of carriers lawfully on
file with the Interstate Commerce Commission or state Railway Commission
provide for minimum carload weights in excess of the above, such minimum
weights shall constitute a carload within the meaning of this rules”); Trade
Rules, 17 WWGT 33-34 (Jan 5, 1927-28) (discussing a letter on the meaning
of carloads). See also Trade Rules Changes, 13 WWGT 38 (Oct 5, 1923-24)
(discussing the amended Rule 32 dealing with carloads).
73
See, for example, Secretary’s Book at 54 (cited in note 59) (“[T]he grading
of the different cereals in our markets in the United States vary so widely that
it is almost impossible to tell by the inspection at one market on any kind of
grain, what the same class of grain will grade in some of the other markets.”);
id at 13 (“We should discuss plans and adopt measures which would lead to
uniform grading.”).
74
Trade Rules to Govern Transactions in Feedstuffs, 10 WWGT 25 (Apr 5,
1920-21). When the feed rules committee was first appointed, it was directed to
make “inquiry from the various markets and for the sake of uniformity define
what should constitute ‘prompt, quick, and immediate shipment.” Id.
75
Id at 25.
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formulating rules that all of us agreed upon as being the most
equitable rules that it was possible to draw up. We were in session
76
two full days. Every point was threshed out.” The fact that the
feed rules were not based strictly on custom, and that they were
similar in many respects to the grain rules, might account, in part,
for the relatively short amount of time it took to draft them.
Although the NGFA Rules Committee has met annually since
1902 “to review the rules . . . [in an effort] to ensure that the Trade
77
Rules reflect—but do not set—industry trade practices,” most rule
78
changes have in fact been attempts to clarify vagueness, respond to
79
80
technological changes, change customs, or to simply adopt more
81
desirable practices. Today, the Trade Rules Committee is
comfortable adopting and amending rules based solely on their
82
desirability and likely effect.
76

Id (statement of EC Dreyer, Chairman of the Feed Committee).
Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 52 (cited in note 56).
Since their inception, the Grain Trade Rules have been amended fifty-eight
times and the Feed Trade Rules thirty-two times. Id.
78
For example, the rules defining “business day/holiday” became more
specific over time.
79
See Trade Rules and Arbitration Rules, 14 Grain Trade Rules R 45
(“Electronic Data Interchange”) (1995) (making the trade rules applicable to
“trades that include electronic transmission and receipt of data in agreed formats
in sustitution for conventional paper-based documents”).
80
See, for example, Grain Trade Rules, Rule 29 (1922), reprinted in 11
WWGT 39 (1921-22) (“The specifications of a contract cannot be altered or
amended without the expressed consent of both the buyer and the seller. This
abolished the custom of ‘silence confirms.’”). See also Hankerson Proposes a
Change, 15 WWGT 27-28 (July 5, 1924-25) (“We [the Trade Rules
Committee] would like to get the reaction of the trade as to the advisability of
incorporating in the rules of the Association, a rule which would be at variance
with other customs in different parts of the country.”).
81
See, for example, Proposed Change in Association’s Trade Rules, 11
WWGT 23 (Sept 20, 1921-22) (proposing “add[ing] to the present rule” a
provision that “[a]ny loss resulting from irregular or incorrect invoices shall
be paid for by the seller,” and justifying it on the grounds that “this idea of the
proposer of this change is that the invoice shall be given more nearly the same
dignity as the Bill of Lading to prevent losses due to careless invoicing”);
NGFA, Trade Rules and Contracts 7 (pamphlet, no dates) (“The general
objectives of the Trade Rules Committee are . . . [among other things] to
formulate and recommend to the membership, trading rules that will bring
about improvement of marketing procedures in the industry . . . and enact new
rules as needed to impartially govern transactions.”).
82
This conclusion is based on my attendance at a meeting of the committee
77
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C. Textile Industry
The debates surrounding the 1936 adoption of the Worth
83
Street Rules (“WSR”), which in modified form continue to govern
84
most textile transactions today, together with other evidence about
the textile trade, suggest that that prior to codification, both trade
practices and the industry meaning of particular terms varied
85
widely.
(Washington, DC 1995).
83
These rules were jointly adopted by the Textile Fabrics Association,
Cotton-Textile Institute, Fine Goods Committee of the Cotton-Textile
Institute, International Association of Garment Manufacturers, Union-Made
Garment Manufacturers’ Association, American Cotton Manufacturers
Association, National Association of Cotton Manufactures, New Bedford
Cotton Manufacturers Association, Wholesale Dry Goods Institute, National
Association of Purchasing Agents, Textile Brokers’ Association, and
Association of Cotton Textile Merchants of New York. WSR 2 (1936). Before
and during the rules-creation process, the textile industry was geographically
concentrated “in a compact area of some six blocks, located just north of city
hall square in lower Manhattan,” which contained the “market for virtually all
of the nation’s output of cotton cloth,” The Association of Cotton Textile
Merchants of New York, 25 Years 1 (Parker-Allston 1944) (“Textile History”).
Although industry members were drawn from many walks of life all over the
country, they developed a close-knit culture of their own. “The first Worth
Streeters were incredibly addicted to the stovepipe hat and frock coat which
continued to be a symbol of this calling, and virtually their uniform under the
presidency of the first Roosevelt.” The Worth Street Story, 22 Am Fabrics 49
(1952). Most merchants ate lunch at one of three eating clubs, and the social
ties they formed were so strong that most transactions were repeat and “every
year millions of dollars worth of goods were sold without a paper that could be
taken to court in the case of a dispute. This unique and really wonderful
method of handling even the largest transactions still represents the
philosophy behind the Worth Street way of doing business.” The Worth Street
Story, 22 Am Fabrics 49 (1952).
84
Jean E. Palmieri, Lawyers Group Publishes Revision of Worth Street Textile
Market Rules, 16 Daily News Record 9 (Nov 12 1986) (“The rules [WSRs] are
commonly recognized as the standard code of procedure and trade customs for
the purchase, sale and use of textiles and Allied Products”). The WSRs were
revised in 1941, 1947, 1964, 1971, and 1986. The 1986 revision was
undertaken by a group of textile lawyers whose goal was to simplify the rules
and make them more accessible. Id. The rules are incorporated into most textile
contracts, which also provide for arbitration under the Rules of the General
Arbitration Council of the Textile and Allied Trades, which are today
administered by the American Arbitration Association. Id.
85
See Note, Enforceable Arbitration of Commercial Disputes in the Textile
Industries, 61 Yale L J 686, 711 n 147 (1952) (“Before the rules [WSRs], major
disagreement was over the inclusion of second quality cloth in each shipment,
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The idea of codifying textile industry customs, in an effort to
“improve trade practices,” was first raised at a 1918 meeting at the
Union League Club, where the idea “of devising a uniform sales
contract to simplify all market transactions” received strong industry
support. Shortly thereafter, the Association of Cotton Textile
Merchants of New York (“ACTM”) was formed, and it made the
adoption of trade rules a high priority, explaining that:
[C]ontracts, to be sacred, must be sound. They must be based
upon fairness to buyer and seller alike; and this implies
acceptance on all sides of standards of fair trade practice. Such
standards usually evolve from practical conditions as customs or
unwritten laws, and men have tried perennially to write them
down, to codify them, so that disagreement and
misunderstanding might be reduced to a reasonable
86
minimum.
The process of drafting the WSRs was fraught with conflict,
involved negotiations among numerous trade associations, and
proceeded slowly. The effort to draft a uniform sales note, which
was to become a key section of the WSRs, began in 1910. In 1920,
six proposed standard notes were recommended to ACTM
members, but as late as 1932 uniformity of practice had not been
87
achieved. In 1932, after two years of committee work devoted
solely to that subject, a standard set of eight Salesnote Clauses was
88
finally published. In 1934 the first standard Cotton Textile
Salesnote was introduced. It was subsequently incorporated into the
89
1936 WSRs after an additional year of committee work.
grace periods after delivery, and the meaning of trade terms. In rayon, where
there is virtually no agreement, conflict on the meaning of trade custom is rife .
. . [In addition,] the definitions of imperfections reflect the manufacture’s
interest that ‘normal irregularities natural to the fibers used’ exist and that ‘a
reasonable number of manufacturing defects must be expected.’ The standards
leave ‘normal irregularities’ undefined . . . There is basic disagreement on what
non-conformity is”).
86
Textile History at 37 (cited in note 83).
87
Association of Cotton Textile Merchants of New York, 25 Years at 40-41
(cited in note 83).
88
Id at 40; see also Uniform Salesnote clauses Recommended for Cotton Textile
Trade, Textile World 33 (Apr 6 1932) (reprinting the Uniform Salesnote
Clauses and a brief statement in their support).
89
Association of Cotton Textile Merchants of New York, 25 Years at 41-42

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

28

Work on other aspects of the rules, such as the compilations of
usages in different branches of the trade, proceeded similarly slowly.
In 1928, for example, a committee was appointed “to begin
negotiations with representatives of the converters ‘for the purpose
of defining some customs prevailing in the purchase and sale of grey
90
goods,” an effort that was not completed until 1931.
The 1936 WSRs, a culmination of eighteen years of concerted
effort on the part of industry participants, were an extraordinarily
detailed set of contract default rules. They covered many stages of
the manufacture and distribution of a variety of textile products and
defined numerous quality specifications, trade terms, and trade
91
customs for transactions in different types of goods. Nevertheless,
even after their adoption, substantial disagreement over the trade
meaning of even words that were themselves defined in the Rules
persisted. For example, although the 1936 WSRs included
definitions of the widely used designations “first quality” and
(cited in note 83).
90
Textile History at 39 (cited in note 83).
91
The 1936 WSRs were thirty-nine pages long. They included a Standard
Cotton Textile Salesnote, codified customs and definitions dealing with
allowances for deficiency, arbitration, “as are,” cancellation, rejections and
claims, deliveries, general strike or lockout and normal production, goods not
sold by description, latent defect, methods of testing materials in dispute,
packing, patent defect, quantities run of the loom or mill, seconds, selection of
representative pieces, selvage count, standard seconds and tailing clauses,
storage and insurance, strike or casualty, tailings, tape selvage and feeler
motions, tensile strength, and use—as well as special customs relating to the
converting trade and what is termed “pertinent data concerning the bag trade.”
WSR “Table of Contents” (1936). The 1941 and 1947 WSRs were seventy-one
pages long. By 1964, the WSRs had expanded to one hundred twenty-eight
pages, and even after the 1986 revision, which was aimed at simplification of
the rules, they were still fifty-eight pages. Despite the extraordinary detail of
the WSRs, traders did not view them as providing the terms of a near complete
contingent-state-contract. See Note, 61 Yale L J at 701 n 88 (cited in note 85)
(“[I]t is quite evident from interviews and questionnaires that the Worth Street
Rules have many loopholes . . . Many of the existing definitions are
inadequate. For example, definitions of first quality or run of the mill depend
on a specific mill’s records. These two terms are extremely variable . . . .
Merchants also point to the failure of the rules to cover many issues raised i n
disputes . . . . Specifically, textile men report that the rules overlook finished
goods and finishing qualities . . . . Correcting these deficiencies, however, is
extremely difficult because textile disputes present an infinite number of
variables.”).
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“seconds,” precisely the types of terms the Code directs courts to
93
look to usage to define, a 1949 National Federation of Textiles
Report of association activities contains a discussion of attempts to
compile “A Dictionary of Trade Expressions:”
What is meant by a ‘piece of goods’? What does r.o.m. mean?
What is a ‘second’? Does ‘as are’ include remnants? These were
questions asked so repeatedly during 1949 that at the close of
the year plans were under way to compile an official list of trade
94
expressions of this type.
Similarly, a 1952 academic study of textile arbitration found
substantial disagreement among transactors as to the meaning of
95
these and other terms, concluding that in the industry as a whole,
92

Definitions and Trade Customs, WSR 32 (1936) (“The word ‘Seconds’ is
applied to cloth inferior to that which the subject mill grades as ‘Standard’ or
‘first quality’ . . . . Unfortunately, the grading of cloth does not lend itself to
specific definition. Practice varies with different mills and for different uses.”).
93
See, for example, Foxco Industries, Ltd v Fabric World, Inc, 595 F2d 976,
984 (5th Cir 1979) (holding that in determining the meaning of “first quality”
it is “proper to look to trade usages,” since parties are “presumed to have
intended the incorporation of trade usage in striking their bargain”).
94
National Federation of Textiles, Inc, The National Federation of Textiles
Reviews . . . Activities, Officers, Members (1948, 1949, 1950). See also National
Federation of Textiles, Annual Report of the National Federation of Textiles, Inc.,
75th Annual Report 19 (1947) (“Coincident with suggestions for revision of the
recommended contract [for Rayon] came repeated questions from buyers of grey
goods as to the meaning of such phrases as ‘run of the mill,’ ‘as are,’ ‘seconds,’
etc. The cotton market had incorporated definitions of such terms in their
Worth Street Rules, but nothing comparable had been prepared for rayon
fabrics, despite the apparent general use of similar terms in that branch of the
industry. It was thought this might be a subject of future determination
through the federation.”).
95
See Note, 61 Yale L J at 691 & nn 26-27 (cited in note 85):
Trade practice in classifying goods as first or second quality may facilitate
buyer’s efforts to escape. These terms are not absolute; they are based on
the particular plant’s past performance, a vague and shifting standard at best
. . . The difference between first and second quality is not clear. B y
definition second quality goods are merchantable and reasonably free from
major defects; yet they are inferior to and contain more imperfections than
first quality goods. The definition says no more. . . . In cottons the
standard [for first and second quality] not only varies from plant to plant
but also from fabric to fabric . . . . Rayon finished goods are classified on
an industry-wide standard . . . . But rayon merchants assert that the
standard is just as vague as that used for cottons.
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96

“trade custom . . . is often amorphous and unsettled.” Indeed, the
study found that lack of consensus on the meaning of customs was
one of the main reasons that transactors strongly preferred three
arbitrator panels to single arbitrator adjudication in which the single
arbitrator’s idiosyncratic view of trade custom would most likely be
97
applied.
Finally, the WSRs themselves posed a challenge to the Code
drafters’ decision to accord written usages (in the form of trade
codes) and unwritten usages the same weight in adjudication. The
Forwards to various editions of the WSRs reveal that textile
merchants conceived of a hierarchy of trade customs. As the 1936
WSR Forward stated, contingencies not covered by the standard
salesnote “shall be interpreted in accordance with the established
rules and customs of the trade, particularly with those rules and
customs which have been formally approved by authorized bodies,
98
representing both buyer and seller.” The WSRs themselves
separately listed customs that applied to the trade as a whole and
those that applied only to particular subdivisions. Moreover, the
1936 Forward cautioned that constant vigilance was needed to
ensure that rules and customs were reviewed periodically so that
“those [customs] that are determined to be entitled to recognition,”
99
could be “list[ed] in proper form.” Over time, the WSRs themselves
96

Id at XX (cited in note 85).
Id at 71 n 152 (“[S]ome converters state that the possibility of trade bias
is so great in the absence of agreement on trade custom that they will not go to
arbitration.”).
98
Forward, WSR 1 (1936) (emphasis added). Although the quoted material
seems to give unwritten custom some legitimacy, the Forward subsequently
discusses the proper sources of authority for arbitral decisionmaking, noting
that “the salesnote and specifications nearly always are considered together, but
not everyone realizes . . . that Trade Customs [as defined in these rules] are
the interpretations of them which should govern sellers and buyers in their
trading and which, in turn, should guide arbitrators in their decisions.” Id.
The rules give the Salesnote precedence over even written custom. WSR 23
(1960) (“In the case of conflict, express or implied, between the Salesnote and
the section on Definitions and Trade Customs, the Salesnote governs.”). Later
WSRs forbid the arbitrators from looking to anything other than the contract
and written custom. See text accompanying note 101. Moreover, even when
merchants agree that something is indeed a customary practice, absent a
contract clause requiring that the practice be followed, they do not necessarily
infer from the fact that something is done that it should be done. See note 215.
99
Forward, WSR 1 (1936).
97
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100

came to be recognized as custom and the rules themselves came to
discourage recourse to unwritten custom. The Standard Salesnote in
the 1986 WSRs introduced a term providing that arbitrators “shall
have no power to alter or in rendering their award to depart from
any express provision of this contract, and their failure to observe
101
this limitation shall constitute grounds for vacating their award.”
More generally, the existence of comprehensive codified
customs was considered an essential reason for the success of textile
arbitration. As the 1952 study noted, “Lack of mutually acceptable
codes of trade custom in rayon has in large part been responsible for
any dislike of rayon arbitration. Agreement on codified trade custom
in cotton, on the other hand, has been a major factor in the success
102
of its arbitration.” And, as a 1919 editorial in Textile World
Journal noted, “in the past, sellers, as well as buyers . . . have viewed
with suspicion such [an arbitration] plan for settling disputes. They
have felt that competitors in their line of business might not be in a
position to give an unbiased decision on matters involving usage in
103
the trade with which they are connected.”
D. Silk
104
The Silk Association of America (SAA) had one of the
100

See WSR 3 (1941) (“By common consent and almost universal usage,
[the WSRs] have come to be recognized as the standard code of procedure and
trade custom applicable to the purchase and sale of cotton textiles and allied
lines.”).
101
WSR 3 (1986).
102
Note, 61 Yale L J at 713 (cited in note 85).
103
Advantages of Arbitration, Textile World Journal 30 (May 17, 1919). See
also Legal Cancellations, Textile World Journal 38 (Dec 18, 1920) (noting that
“[a]t various times when the subject of a standard sales note has been
considered, the need of such standards and tolerances has been recognized, but
with very few exceptions, none have been developed that could not be punched
full of holes by clever lawyers. The usual procedure when a case of this kind
comes before the court is for both the plaintiff and defendant to call as
witnesses a number of so-called authorities to testify regarding trade custom.”).
104
American Arbitration Association, Year Book on Commercial Arbitration
in the United States, 1927 772 (Oxford 1927) (“The Silk Association of
America, Inc., is a national organization, established ‘to promote the
advancement and prosperity of the silk interests. [Its members include] raw silk
importers, dealers and brokers, commission throwsters, manufacturers of swing
silks and twists, broad silks, ribbons and hatbands, laces, nets and veilings,
knit goods and glove silks; skein dyers, piece dyers; printers and finishers;
manufacturers of silk machinery and supplier; manufacturers’ agents and

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

32
105

earliest and most well-regarded arbitration systems. Like the
textile system, it governed transactions among merchants who
played fixed roles in the chain of production and distribution of silk.
106
The arbitration system was created in 1898, but trade rules were
not adopted until several years later. The SAA By-Laws noted that
the Association aimed, among other things, to “establish and
maintain uniformity and certainty in the customs and commercial
107
usages of the silk trade,” and early reports noted that “committees
of the Association are intelligently and constantly . . . seeking to
improve trade usages, and to substitute better methods as between
108
buyers and sellers.”
The rules creation process at the SAA was even109 more
contentious and drawn out than in other associations. For
110
example, work on the Trade Rules for Raw Silk began in 1901,
but after “two years of fruitless discussion of the rules proposed,111 the
committee was discharged at the request of its own chairman.” As
an Association report explained, “[t]he get-together spirit was not
sufficiently pronounced to override the differences that arose when
112
the rules in detail were considered.” Work on the rules resumed in
1907, and new rules were adopted in 1908, after fourteen separate
committee meetings, “several conferences between the Raw Silk
113
Division . . . and the Board of Managers” to address “difficulties,”
commission merchants.”).
105
Irving S. Paul, J.W. Millard, and James S. Taylor, Trade Association
Activities 112 (Department of Commerce 1927) (describing and lauding the
operation of the SAA arbitration tribunal); I.L. Blunt, American Commercial
Arbitration, 3 Arbitration J 299 (1939) (describing the SAA as an arbitration
“pioneer”).
106
Blunt, 3 Arbitration J at 300 (cited in note 105). The SAA also
sponsored an Examination Bureau to make quality determinations and an
Adjustment Bureau that offered informal mediation services.
107
By-Laws of the SAA, Art II, § 1, in SAA, Forty-first Annual Report 12
(cited in note 27).
108
SAA Thirty-First Annual Report 28 (1903).
109
One reason for the unusual level of tension may have been that buyers
associations negotiated with sellers associations so that the distributive impact
of the outcomes reached might, along many dimensions, have been quite
serious.
110
Efficient Distribution an Aid to Industry, 6 Silkworm 367 (Feb 1925).
111
SAA, Thirty-fifth Annual Report 23 (1907).
112
Id.
113
SAA, Thirty-sixth Annual Report 35-36 (1908).
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114

and the “approval of some amendments.” In approving the rules,
the Board of Managers emphasized, as did the preambles to the rules
115
themselves, that they were merely default rules.
116
The creation of the Silk
Throwsters Rules 118
in 1907 after a
117
year of “active group work,” was also contentious, but proceeded
relatively quickly, perhaps because the group adopted, “practically the
119
same rules which obtain in Europe.” The goal of the codification
114
Id at 36. These Rules were amended in 1912, SAA, Fortieth Annual
Report 31 (1912), in 1921 after “a year of careful study on the part of the
committee,” Revision, 3 Silkworm 73 (May 1921), and again in 1924 after the
“culmination of many months of intensive effort on the part of a committee of
representative buyers and sellers to revise the rules in such a way as to cover
changes in trade customs which had developed since . . . 1921,” including
changes in credit terms and “provisions for claim, rejections and replacements
which were rephrased so as to conform with customs which had developed i n
the trade and to cover those points which had not, perhaps, been clearly
understood.” SAA, Fifty-Third Annual Report 26 (1925).
115
SAA, Thirty-Sixth Annual Report 83 (1908); Raw Silk Rules and
Regulations, id at 77 (“[N]othing in the following rules shall be construed as
waiving the right in individual transactions to make any special or distinct
contrary agreement, but that the rules shall govern only in cases where no
special or specific contract exists.”).
116
These rules were quite detailed. They defined acceptable tolerances,
manufacturing techniques, various allocations of liability, payment, and
transport. They also noted that “the amount of loss to be allowed in the actual
working of a given silk (to be arrived at as above stated) is universally a matter
of agreement between the manufacturer and the throwster.” SAA, Thirty-Sixth
Annual Report 32 (1908).
117
Trade Practices, 2 Silkworm 28 (Feb 1921).
118
The creation of other sets of rules was somewhat less contentious. The
Rules Governing Broad Silks, “which embody the best sentiments of
prominent manufactures in this leading branch of the industry,” were drafted
in 1912-13. SAA, Forty-First Annual Report 45 (1913). The effort to adopt
them, however, began in 1907 and “was continued intermittently for a number
of years until, by virtue of the most dogged efforts and persistency, a set of
trade practices was adopted and approved.” Trade Practices, 2 Silkworm 28 (Feb
1921). The Rules Governing Spun Silk were drafted during 1921-22 and
adopted in 1923 with little fanfare. SAA, 51st Annual Report 56 (1923). They
were amended in 1928 in a process described as “translating customary trade
practice into uniform trade rules.” SAA, Fifty-Sixth Annual Report 16 (1928).
In addition, “Rules Governing the Commission Throwing of Silk” were
adopted in 1927 as part of a renewed attempt to achieve “advancement in the
standardization of trade practices through the adoption of rules and forms.”
SAA, 55th Annual Report 17 (1927). During 1927, a wide variety of standard
form contracts were adopted. SAA, Fifty-Sixth Annual Report at 17-25.
119
SAA, Thirty-Sixth Annual Report 53 (1908).
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movement was to “[get] business conditions on a more uniform basis
and [formulate] a standard set of trade rules, which would be
120
acceptable to both manufacturer and throwster.”
The creation of Rules for Thrown Silk was also a controversial
process. After several years of committee work, the first draft of the
rules was proposed in 1923, but rejected by the Association. This
raised the ire of their author, who stormed:
The Thrown Silk Division of the Association has been at work
with a committee appointed by the association for a number of
months past on rules to regulate the sale of thrown silk in all its
branches, and after a great deal of time and labor, their
recommendations were submitted to the Board of Managers of
the Association. These recommendations were based on
current market practice, and it is to be regretted that the Board
did not see fit to accept them as submitted, and thus place an
important branch of the silk industry on a sound economic
121
basis.
The rules were eventually adopted in 1924, “the result of four
years’ endeavor to compile the list of best trade practices . . . based on
122
suggestions and experiences from both buyers and sellers,” and
123
were said to “fill a long felt need.” In the late 1920’s the
Association also began to promulgate standard form contracts in an
effort to bring about even greater uniformity in trading terms. The
various rules adopted by the SAA were amended numerous times
during the 1920’s and 1930’s, ostensibly to respond to changes in
124
trade practices.
120
SAA, Thirty-Fifth Annual Report 55 (1907). See also SAA, Thirty-Sixth
Annual Report 30 (1908) (amending the Throwsters’ Rules to include a
“standard weight” provision to eliminate “the former uncertainty and
divergence in the kind of weight charged for by throwsters.”).
121
SAA, Fifty-First Annual Report 55 (1923 ).
122
SAA, Fifty-Second Annual Report 23 (1924).
123
Id.
124
See notes 118 and 120; SAA, 57th Annual Report 22 (1929) (“Both
revisions of finished goods rules and compilation of raw goods rules have been
based on market practices and customs, generally accepted in the silk
industry.”). Some of the changes introduced in the 1930s might have been
responses to the National Industrial Recovery Act and government initiatives
related to it.
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The contentiousness surrounding the adoption of silk trade
rules is in some respects surprising. There was much more
agreement about the content of existing practices than in other
industries, perhaps because of the somewhat smaller number of
individuals engaged in the trade. However, unlike merchants in
many industries who often venerated existing practices, silk
transactors frequently criticized existing practices as being out of
125
date, inefficient, or just plain stupid. Like the grain dealers, they
lamented the difficulty of changing existing practices. As one SAA
banquet speaker put it, “[h]uge question marks are boldly scribed on
the walls of custom, hoary with age, and covered with the ivy of
126
reverence and toleration.” Similarly, as the 1918 Annual Report
noted:
Modifications of trade customs are exceedingly difficult to
introduce. Trade practices are handed on from generation to
generation of office administrators and when a business routine
125
SAA, Thirty-Fifth Annual Report 57 (1908) (“[W]hy this stupid custom
[of ‘another bill and the old price’] should continue, no satisfactory explanation
can be given. There is no more reason for this, than for the equally foolish
custom that prevailed for many years in giving the jobber ‘protection in case of
a decline in price.’”); SAA, XLIII Annual Report 41 (1915) (noting that tie silk
manufacturers would be better off if it were “possible to induce the trade to
break away from their fixed traditions.”) (emphasis added). See also SAA, Third
Annual Report 64-65 (1875) (“It is strange how far custom will lead us, when
our better judgment would not go a step. This may be especially the case, i n
regard to the custom of charging single ounces on a bale of silk. Not a
merchant, not a manufacturer, not a throwster, but knows that silk is very
sensitive of atmospheric changes, that bale will vary by weight a few ounces if
weighted twice in one day, and yet they all sanction this custom by tacitly
conforming to it without objection.”); the Ribbons Report, in SAA, FortyFourth Annual Report 65 (1916) (harshly condemning the practice of the “the
open order, with no definite date of assortment,” attributing the practice to “the
custom of the trade, as constituted at present [which] did not compel [buyers]
to assort the goods until they were needed, which might be at any future time,
if at all”); SAA, XXXI Annual Report 38 (1903) (“It has often been noted that it
is the custom with most manufacturers to continue their output for the Fall
consumption on the same basis as the Spring, when it is known, without
contradiction, that the demand for the last part of the year is much less than for
the first half.”).
126
SAA, XLII Annual Report 145 (1914). See also SAA, Thirty-Sixth
Annual Report 21-22 (1908) (“The silk interests have come to one absolute
conclusion, and that is that all past methods that have not proven sound and
reliable need to be revised.”).
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is established in an organization it often requires a
reorganization, a so-called ‘shake-up,’ to introduce innovation.
Considering this conservatism the [success of the SAA in
modifying practices] may be looked upon justly as a real
127
accomplishment of the Association.
The hostility toward custom in this industry might have been due,
at least in part, to the fact that many customs were perceived to be,
and might well have been, “customs of adhesion,” or attempts of
particular branches of the industry to secure competitive advantage.
Although customs in the silk industry were better established
than customs in other industries, there was still much disagreement
about the meaning of basic trade terms. For example, at the 1915
SAA Convention, one speaker pointed out that there was no
common understanding of the term “Double Extra” silk:
There is not a man here who could give a definition. Some of
you men, however, can tell us what No. I Buckwheat coal is,
and for the simple reason you have a standard to go by, and
certain tests that No. I Buckwheat must live up to. When we
have a standard for Double Extra silk, and certain tests that a
Double Extra must meet, then will you be able to define a
Double Extra. The present Double Extra silk is any one man’s
128
opinion.
In addition, numerous other practices, particularly those relating129to
grade designations, were quite varied in different geographic areas.
127

SAA, 55th Annual Report 82 (1918). SAA, Forty-Fourth Annual Report
57-58 (19XX) (Where the Tie silk Association boasted that progress had been
made in achieving change in the face of powerful customs; noting that “[w]hat
had been hitherto considered impossible for the neckware trade, that is to pay
more than 80 to 82 1/2 cents for their 50 cent line, was accomplished. Old
traditions were brushed aside.”).
128
See Proceedings of the First National Silk Convention 136 (1915) (“First
Silk Convention”). More notably, in 1923 a Committee of the British Silk
Association wrote a report attempting to define the word silk. See Proper Use of
the Word “Silk” Defined by Committee of British Association, 5 Silkworm 176 (July
1923) (“Silk means the natural product of the silkworm, whether Net Silk or
Spun Silk” and should not, with the exception of “[c]ertain smallwares
containing Silk in combination with other fibres . . . [that] have been by long
established custom known as Silks,” be “used for combined fabric products.”).
129
See, for example, First Silk Convention at 119 (cited in note 128) (“There
exists in raw silks a Japan, Italian, China, French, Turkish and Canton
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E. Methodological Problems
A serious difficulty raised by drawing on the trade association
codification debates to explore whether industry-wide, unwritten
customs existed is that the data are also consistent with the
possibility that industry-wide customs did exist, but that the
codification debates provided an opportunity for rent-seeking
130
subgroups to fabricate disputes about the content of custom and to
classifications, which are all unlike . . . . Taking everything into consideration,
the six classifications have no resemblance to each other at all.”); James
Chittick, Silk Manufacturing and its Problems 25 (James Chittick 1913)
(“Yokohama classifications do not correspond with those of New York, the No
1 of Japan being called here Best No 1”). Moreover, the way quality
designations were defined tended to change from year to year as crop conditions
changed. See, for example, First Silk Convention at 119 (attributing the
“fluctuation of classifications,” to the fact that “after a rainy season, when all
the qualities of silk are poorer, the same classifications are retained so that an
Extra in 1915 is different quality from an Extra in 1914”). This type of
variation would create significant problems for a court applying the Code
because cases typically go to trial several years after a dispute arises, so
reconstructing the content of time-dependant industry customs of this type
would be quite difficult.
130
Conversely, statements that custom exists must also be interpreted
cautiously. The Report of the 1909 convention of the NHA, for example
contains a discussion in which one transactor asserted the existence of a custom
relating to a shipment terms and another member nonetheless suggested that
they “write it out.” NHA, Report of the Sixteenth Annual Convention 216 (1909).
As they attempted to formulate a rule on the matter they tried to answer a series
of hypotheticals until it became clear that the proponent of the custom could
not defend it as providing the relevant answers. Id at 216-17. Similarly, at the
1999 Texas Grain and Feed Association conference, a speaker on the
arbitration process noted, “it turns out [with respect to customs of the trade
that] people who think they agreed have very different ideas when it is applied
to specific cases.”
It is also possible that, to the extent that participants in the codification
debates received prestige or improved business contacts from actively
participating in the committees of the national trade association in their
industry, they may have had an incentive to exaggerate the lack of uniformity
in trade practices in order to enhance the perceived importance of the
Association and its codification efforts. Although this explanation might
account for some of the statements made by high-ranking association founders
in the early years, it is unlikely to be a complete explanation. The codification
of trade rules was considered an important association function. However, the
formation of national associations was largely motivated by, and derived its
prestige from, associations’ efforts to lobby the Federal government for railroad
tariff reductions, agricultural subsidies, and a uniform bill of lading law. In
addition, many codification debate participants had very different incentives
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lobby for the recognition of the trade practices most favorable to
131
132
them. It is difficult to negate this possibility entirely. However,
even if rent-seeking does account for the lack of consensus as to the
content of some trade practices in certain industries, it is unlikely to
133
account for all or even most incidences of disagreement. In
addition, because all industry trade rules are default provisions that
can be varied by contract, and because in many industries proposed
rules had to be approved by the membership at large, with each firm
getting one vote regardless of its size, the amount of rent that a
group could capture through the rules-creation process, relative to
the rent it could capture through the contracting process and/or the
134
custom-creation process, is not so large.
from association executives. For example, much of the impetus for uniform
written rules came from merchant arbitrators confronted with the need to
decide cases. The prestige of the title “arbitrator” and the perceived legitimacy of
these tribunals depended on the arbitrators resting their decisions on reasons
that industry members would regard as proper, yet the arbitrators consistently
lamented in their opinions and annual committee reports the lack of uniform
customs that could be used to resolve disputes. Although it might be argued
that this gave them an incentive to lobby for the adoption of rules, the position
of arbitrator generally lasted only for a year or two, so it is unlikely that they
would have an incentive to undermine the legitimacy of the tribunal today for a
benefit that would accrue, if at all, only to those appointed to decide cases in the
future.
131
Indeed, in some industries, such as silk, this might have been a
significant cause of disagreement. However, even if rent-seeking did account
for much of the disagreement over the content of customs, the existence of such
disagreements would have serious consequences for the incorporation strategy.
If rent-seeking attempts could not be distinguished from genuine differences i n
practice at association hearings, it is highly unlikely that an arbitration panel
or court could make such a distinction in an actual case where the parties also
have strong financial incentives to lie.
132
The actual opportunity to rent-seek likely varied widely across industries
due to differences in their voting rules, committee structures, and committee
compositions (elected or appointed), as well as the order of their annual meeting
agendas.
133
In addition, if rent-seeking was part of the process of codifying national
rules, it might also have been part of the local rules-creation process and the
process of custom-capture. It is therefore yet another force that works against
rather than for the emergence of strong-form, pure Hayekian customs. See note
XX and accompanying text.
134
Some trade rules had to be separately approved by buyers and sellers
associations. See, for example, ATMI and ACSA, Southern Mill Rules at 32
(cited in note 27). The WSRs were also separately approved by groups of
buyers and sellers. See WSR 2 (1936) (listing sponsoring organizations).
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There are a number of additional reasons why rent seeking is
unlikely to account for most disagreement about the content of
customary practices. First, in industries that were composed of
numerous local associations and exchanges, before the formation of a
national association, the written rules adopted by these small
associations and exchanges differed widely. This gives some
assurance that the debates relating to differences in customary
practices reflected at least some real differences in the way that
business was done in different parts of the country, rather than mere
fabricated differences between rent-seeking industry subgroups.
Second, the 1952 textile study found widespread disagreements over
the meaning of usages of trade in a context where neither amending
135
the rules nor deciding an actual case was at stake. The existence of
similar disagreements in other industries such as grain, lumber, and
silk are confirmed by articles in their trade press and/or similar
136
surveys. Third, many of the codification efforts were motivated by
135

See Note, 61 Yale L J at 686 (cited in note 85).
For example, lumber associations conducted and published a number of
surveys of trade practices that were not in any way related to the rules-creation
or amendment processes. These surveys found that industry members did not
generally agree on the content of business practices. See, for example,
NAWLA, Adjusting Salesmen’s Commissions, North Coast Weekly Letter No
192 (Sept 29, 1925) (Reporting the results of a fifty person survey—asking
“Where a commission salesman is paid so much per M on his sales and the
customer claims a shortage of say, a few thousand feet, is it common practice to
deduct the amount of the commission to be paid the salesman where an
allowance is made covering such a shortage? Where a commission man is paid
on a percentage basis, say five percent, and a claim for any reason allowed to
customer, is a deduction, based on the allowance, made from commission
paid?”—and noting that “[t]he majority (35) state they do not think it is
customary or good business policy to revise the commission where shortages or
grade complaints develop . . . . Fifteen members stated they believed the
salesman should stand his pro-rata of the deduction in both cases . . . . The
majority who answered the second question stated that where salesman is
working on a percentage of the profits, the salesman should stand his share of
any losses”; also reporting six statements of respondents setting out further
nuances.); NAWLA, Who Collects Rate Overcharges?, North Coast Weekly
Letter No 193 (Oct 6, 1925) (noting similar divergence of opinion, correlated
with the size of the firm, to the question: “When stock is bought f.o.b. mill
basis on guaranteed weight, and the transportation company makes an
overcharge in rate, is it up to the buyer to collect from the railroad, or should
he charge the mill and let the mill collect claim?”). See also note 221
(discussing silk surveys).
136
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a perceived need to make customs more uniform if
misunderstandings were to be avoided and arbitration was to become
an effective way to resolve disputes. If, however, the geographical
scope of customs was co-extensive with the geographical scope of
efficient trade, and if these customs were, in fact, generally known
and implicitly assented to, codification should not have been
necessary to achieve predictable arbitral outcomes and avoid
137
commercial misunderstanding. Fourth, contemporary interview
137

If the type of consensus about and widespread knowledge of the content
of trade usages that is assumed by the Code is thought to consistently emerge
in mercantile contexts, it is necessary to explain why, from at least the middle
ages to the present, there have been so many attempts to codify mercantile
customs. Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S
Econ J 644, 649 (1989) (“[A]s the norms of [medieval merchant] commercial
law became more precisely specified they were increasingly recorded . . . not
[in] statutory codes . . . [but in] written commercial instruments and
contracts.”); Gerard Malynes, I Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria: or the Ancient
Law-Merchant a, a2 (“To the Courteous Reader”) (T. Baffet 1685, Professional
Books reprint 1981) (compiling, in meticulous detail, trade practices and laws
“[f]or the maintenance of Traffick and Commerce [which] is so pleasant,
amiable and acceptable unto all Princes and Potentates, that Kings have been
and at this day are of the Society of Merchants: And many times,
notwithstanding their particular differences and quarrels, they do nevertheless
agree in this course of trade . . . whereupon I have been moved, by long
observation to put the worthiness of the customary Law of Merchants, in plain
and compendious writing, by undoubted principles, familiar examples and
demonstrative reasons”); A Member of the Massachusetts Bar, The Business
Guide and Legal Companion 59, 60 (no publisher listed 1845) (defining, like
many commercial dictionaries, words like “hogshead,” “barley corns,” and
“pennyweights”); J.R. McCulloch, II A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical, and
Historical, of Commerce and Commercial Navigation, 720, 724 (Thomas Wardle
1841) (Henry Vathke, ed) (providing tables of weights and measures, and
defining words, and recording customs such as the custom “of allowing more
than 16 ounces to the pound of butter [which] used to be very general i n
several parts of the country”).
Today, the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), a major provider
of international arbitration services, has promulgated several quasi-official
codifications of customs. Most important are the Incoterms, “a set of
international rules for the interpretation of the chief terms used in foreign trade
contracts, for the optimal use of businessman who prefer the certainty of
uniform national rules.” ICC, Incoterms: International rules for the interpretation
of trade terms 6 (ICC 1980). These rules acknowledge the undesirability of
interpreting agreements by reference to custom, explaining that “[e]very
endeavor has been made to limit such references to custom to the absolute
minimum.” Id at 8. However, noting that it has been “impossible to avoid
[references to custom] altogether,” the rules advise the “seller and buyer . . . to
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evidence from the feed trade in Texas suggests that even within the
138
state, trade practices regarding core contractual terms vary widely.
Fifth, at associations like the NHA, where proposed rules139were
subject to floor debate at the Association’s annual convention, and
debates were reported verbatim in the Association’s Annual Report,
there were publicity-based reputational constraints on debate
keep such general and particular customs in mind when negotiating their
contract.” Id. The Incoterms implicitly recognize that customs may be highly
local in nature by including a choice-of-custom provision, which provides that
customary matters are to be “decided by the custom of the particular trade or
port.” Id. To further reduce uncertainty, the ICC has published several more
particularized complications of customs. See, for example, ICC, Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, ICC Pub No 500 (1993); ICC,
Uniform Rules for Collections, ICC Pub No 522 (1995); ICC, Uniform Rules for
Contract Guarantees, ICC Pub No 325 (1978).
However, it is important not to attach too much weight to the possibility
that the perceived need to write customs down suggests that customs are not
sufficiently definite or uniform. There are a variety of other reasons,
particularly in the trade association context, that the codification of custom
might have been undertaken. First, when the relatively new national
associations decided to adopt rules, they may have enhanced the legitimacy of
the rules and reduced suspicion about the drafters’ motivations by claiming that
these rules were mere codifications of existing practices. Second, because most
trade association arbitrators were industry participants, codification might have
been viewed as useful for constraining some types of arbitral bias, or making
such bias easier to detect, thereby reducing arbitral discretion and enhancing
the legitimacy and perceived fairness of the tribunals. Maintaining the
tribunals’ appearance of fairness was especially important prior to 1920, when
both ex ante agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards were legally
unenforceable. Third, because most arbitrators were not lawyers, codified rules
enabled them to decide cases without having to familiarize themselves with the
intricacies of sales law. Fourth, codification might have been viewed as
necessary because, as the pace of technological and market changes increased,
practices needed to change more quickly and in more coordinated ways than
was possible through the slow accretion of custom. Finally, associations might
have desired quality standardization and uniformity of trade practice because
they can facilitate anti-competitive behavior.
138
Interview with TGFA executive (1998) (on file with author); Interview
with TGFA Board Member (1998) (on file with author); Discussant at TGFA
Meeting (Feb 18, 1999) (explaining that the TGFA “Rules Committee didn’t
add certain truck rules because there were many different customs,” but noting
that this was “okay because trucks tend to travel in a 150 mile radius and people
know how things are done in their area.”).
139
In the early days of national trade associations, one of the main purposes
of the annual convention was to form relationships and learn about the
reputations of transactors in other localities. As a consequence, transactors
attending these meetings were quite conscious of guarding their reputation.
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participants. A transactor who suggested something was a custom
when it was not risked reputational harm. If, for example, there was
a custom that it was reasonable to take ten days to inspect goods
before rejecting them, and a buyer stood up at the convention and
said that it was reasonable to take twenty days, sellers would be wary
140
of dealing with him in the future. If, however, the buyer could be
sure that all other buyers would get up immediately and say twenty
days, he might well engage in this type of distributional bargaining.
In industries like silk, where the rules were the outcome of
bargaining among groups of buyers and sellers who each deliberated
in secret and then held a meeting between designated
representatives of each group to negotiate the final rules,
reputational constraints would have been much weaker, and the silk
debates do indeed contain many instances of what might have been
rent-seeking behavior. Sixth, some of the terms about whose
meaning transactors disagreed have no distributive impact. For
example, outside of the context of a specific dispute, a decision on
how many days are meant by the terms “prompt” or “quick” does not
have distributional implications, because most trade rules contained a
menu of time designations to choose from. Seventh, in industries
whose trade journals had columns where members could pose
hypothetical questions to association executives, members often
141
asked “what is the custom with regard to X.”
Finally, the testimony of representatives of merchant
associations in the hearings on the proposed Code provides support
for the notion that customs did not exist and reveals that merchants
were consciously aware of, and opposed to, the Code’s incorporation
strategy. The opinions they expressed were remarkably consistent
with the arguments made during the intra-association codification
debates, most of which had taken place many years earlier. For
140

Similarly, in the grain industry where many merchants were buyers one
day and sellers the next, they would have had no reason to skew the rules
toward buyers or sellers.
141
See, for example, Questions and Answers, 8 Silkworm 240 (Oct 1926) (“A
piece goods manufacturer inquires if it is customary in the trade for the
manufacturer to return the cops to the throwster.”); Questions and Answers, 8
Silkworm 300 (Dec 1926) (“Is it customary to include in a contract with
commission weavers a clause to the effect that the house must use only such
quantities of yarns as are in accordance with the standards and rules of the
Association.”).
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142

example, the Commerce and Industry Association,
a trade
organization of merchants, objected to including “observance of
reasonable commercial standards” in the Code’s good faith
143
provision. The Association explained that “the usages, customs
and practices of business are far from being uniform, and the
determination of whether a merchant has conformed to reasonable
commercial standards would be difficult and would produce excessive
144
litigation.” These views were also echoed by the New York Law
142

Formerly the Merchants Association of New York.
UCC § 1-203 & cmt xx.
144
Commerce and Industry Association of New York, Inc. (“CIANY”),
Memorandum of Task Group of the Special Committee of the Commerce and
Industry Association of New York, on the Uniform Commercial Code on Article 2,
Sales and Article 6, Bulk Transfers, in Study of UCC Memoranda 24, 29,
reprinted in State of New York, 1 Report of the Law Revision Commissioner for
1954 at 88-93 (cited in note 13). In addition, during the hearings, Professor
John O. Honnold posed some questions to representatives of the Merchants
Association in an attempt to see if proposed Code provisions conformed to
trade understanding of particular terms. In most of their responses, association
representatives stated that practice was not “exactly uniform.” For example,
when asked about the meaning of “F.O.B. vessel,” a representative noted,
“while it is trade understanding in certain fields that the buyer must arrange for
steamer space . . . in practical operation buyers customarily depend upon the
sellers to make arrangements and ship via the most suitable and expeditious
vessel available at the time the goods are ready for export.” CIANY,
Memorandum Replying to Questions Propounded by Professor Honnold at Law
Revision Commission Hearing I-D, in UCC Memoranda at 67, reprinted in id at
131. In response to questions about the meaning of other proposed terms, the
merchants said,
there appears to be a diversity of opinion as to inspection right where the
contract terms are ‘F.O.B. vessel’ or ‘F.A.S.’ While the view has been
expressed in a particular industry that the purchaser has the right to
inspect goods before payment under such terms, the general export practice
apparently is that the buyer has no right of inspection before payment
unless there is specific prior agreement that such inspection or examination
is required by the buyer. It is recommended practice that such prior
agreement also specify whose account is to be charged for the cost of such
inspection since such cost may be appreciable when the charges for
inspection engineers, opening and closing constraints, and making goods
available for examination are considered.
Id. The Association also objected to part of the proposed Code’s cure
provision that gives the seller additional time to cure if he “had reasonable
grounds to believe [the nonconforming tender] would be acceptable,” UCC §
2-508(2), where the reasonableness of grounds is determined, in part, by
reference to “prior course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade,”
id at cmt 2. In its criticism of the provision, the Association explained, “There
143
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145

Revision Committee’s Report on the Code.
Thus, while
Llewellyn justified the incorporation strategy on the grounds that it
would make merchant law more accommodating to merchant
concerns, the approach was not viewed in a positive light by the very
merchants whose transactions it was designed to govern.
F. Conclusion
Although the evidence presented here has not conclusively
demonstrated that the types of usages of trade and commercial
standards, and industry-specific meanings of terms, referenced in the
Code do not ever exist, it has suggested that the empirical
foundation on which the Code in general, and its incorporation
strategy in particular, is built, may be weak. In addition, as the next
Section suggests, the lack of consensus on the content of customary
practices documented in the case studies, is in no way surprising
since there are a number of reasons to suspect that uniform customs
relating to many aspects of a transaction would not exist. As a
consequence, it is useful to reconsider the justifications for the
Code’s incorporation strategy and to look briefly at the ways that it
has been invoked by parties and used by courts in decided cases.

is no reason why a seller should ever believe that a non-conforming tender
would be acceptable to the buyer.” CIANY, Memorandum of Task Group, i n
UCC Memoranda at 37, reprinted in id at 101.
145
The New York Law Revision Commission
was a little dubious about the widespread use of business terminology
throughout the Code. Not that it has anything against business
terminology as such—it is often very convenient—but it often lacks
precision. It often means something in one part of the country, something
else in another part, or as between different industries or lines of business.
. . . [T]he Commission is anxious to see a statute that would have an
ascertained or ascertainable meaning.
Panel Discussion on the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 Bus Law 49, 57 (1956).
The Commission also expressed doubts about the anticipatory repudiation
rules, explaining that “reasonable grounds for insecurity, adequate assurance of
due performance [and] commercial standards,” were terms that “should be more
concrete, more specific. It did not like this resort to rather vague, uncertain,
indefinite language.” Id at 56-57. Even greater skepticism about the
incorporation of trade usage was expressed in connection with the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. See
C.M. Bianca and M.J. Bonell, Commentary on the International Sales Law: The
1980 Vienna Sales Convention 105 (Giuffré 1987).
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II. THE IN CO RPORATION ST RATEGY RE VISI TED
Code drafters and later commentators justified the pervasive
incorporation strategy by noting that contracts are incomplete
because rationality is bounded; because the transaction and strategic
costs of including provisions dealing with all contingencies,
particularly remote or unforeseen contingencies, are high; and
because it is difficult to reduce the parameters of some obligations to
a writing. They further maintained that customs are intended and
146
understood by merchants to be an integral part of their agreement
and that these customs, along with the merchants’ course of actual
performance under their contracts, provide the best indication of
147
what they intend their writing to mean. In addition, at least with
respect to using custom to fill gaps, the incorporation strategy has
also been defended on the grounds that the provisions provided by
custom are likely to be more efficient than those that a court could
provide. A closer look at these justifications, however, suggests that
they are based on inaccurate empirical assumptions and are
theoretically weak.
A review of a subset of Code cases, from 1970 to the present,
148
invoking the usage of trade provision, reveals that very few alleged
149
customs relate to remote or unforeseen contingencies. Most of the
146

See UCC § 2-202 cmt 2.
See id at § 2-208 cmt 1 (“[P]arties themselves know best what they have
meant by their words of agreement and their action under that agreement is the
best indication of what that meaning was.”).
148
See id at § 1-205. The sample includes cases in Uniform Commercial
Code Case Digest Para 1205.2(1) (West 1998), under the heading “Usage of
Trade—In General” (excluding supplement). Eliminated were cases dealing
with the secured financing aspect of the transaction; one case where the concept
of a usage was simply contrasted with the concept of course of dealing, see
Capitol Converting Equipment Inc v Lep Transport, Inc, 750 F Supp 862, XX
(ND Ill 1990), affd, 965 F2d 391 (7th Cir 1992) (where the course of dealing or
usage dealt with terms of payment); and one case dealing with whether a
contract existed that held the existence or nonexistence of any usages was
irrelevant, see Wichita Sheet Metal Supply, Inc v Dhalstrom and Ferrell
Construction Co, 246 Kan 557, 792 P2d 1043, XX (1990). Although the rather
small number of cases in the digest category “Usage of Trade—In General” has
led some to suggest that the Code’s incorporation strategy is, as a practical
matter, unimportant, this ignores the numerous other Code provisions and
comments that incorporate usage of trade. See note 1.
149
But see Cosden Oil & Chemical Co v Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft, 736
F2d 1064, 1076 (5th Cir 1984) (considering whether “a custom or trade usage
147
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alleged customs relate to core aspects of any merchant transaction
151
such as: the permitted152tolerance in quality; the definition
of the
153
good to be exchanged; the time required for notice; the time for
154
inspection and rejection; the time, place, and manner of delivery;
155
156
price and/or quantity adjustments;
payment terms;
and
relating to force majeure existed in the polystyrene industry.”).
150
Most industry trade codes either require these aspects of a transaction to
be covered by contract and/or provide bright-line gap-filling default rules
relating to them. See, for example, Trade Rules of the National Hay Association,
Rule 1, in NHA, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention 83 (1921) (“It
shall be the duty of both buyer and seller to include in their original articles of
trade, however conducted, the following specifications: Number of cars, tons,
or bales. Size of bales. Grade of hay or straw. Price. Terms of payment. Rate
basing point. Time of shipment. Route.”); Grain Trade Rules (as amended Mar
13, 1995), Rule 1, in NGFA, Trading Rules and Arbitration Rules 3 (NGFA
1995) (noting that it is the duty of the buyer and seller to include in their
contract or confirmation, the “(a) Date of contract; (b) Quantity[;] (c) Kind and
grade of grain[;] (d) Price[;] (e) Type of inspection[;] (f) Type of weights[;] (g)
Applicable Trade Rules to apply[;] (h) Transportation Specifications: (1) Type
of conveyance; (2) Type of billing[:] Transit (storage or milling)[,] Non
Transit[,] Export[,] Multi-car specifications[;] (3) Port of origin or delivery;
or rate basing point[;] (4) Loading weight requirements[;] (5) Time of
shipment or delivery[;] (6) Route[;] (7) Responsibility for freight increases or
decreases[;] [8] Buyer’s and Seller’s conveyance[;] (9) Type of bill of lading[;]
(i) Payment terms; (j) Other terms”).
151
Beachcomber Coins, Inc v Boskett, 166 NJ Super 442, 400 A2d 78, XX
(1979) (where the alleged custom related to quality verification usually
undertaken before a purchase is final).
152
Williams v Curtin, 807 F2d 1046, 1049, XX (DC Cir 1986) (where the
alleged usage related to the meaning of the term “slaw cabbage” in a situation
where one party contended it only meant “large cabbage” while the other
contended that it meant “all cabbage suitable for making coleslaw”); Latex Glove
Co Inc v Gruen, 146 Ill App 3d 868, 497 NE2d 466, XX (1986) (where the
alleged usage went to the definition of good to be sold, specifically whether the
sale of printed material included the sale of related by-products of the printing
process).
153
Lackawanna Leather Co v Martin & Stewart, Ltd, 730 F2d 1197 (8th
1984) (noting that the appellant sought to introduce usage defining what
constitutes a reasonable time for inspection and revocation).
154
Ore & Chemical Corp v Howard Butcher Trading Corp, 455 F Supp 1150,
1152 (E D Penn 1978).
155
See Southern Concrete Services, Inc v Mabelton Contractors, Inc, 407 F Supp
581 (ND Ga 1975), affd, 569 F2d 1154 (5th Cir 1978) (although contract
included price and quantity provisions, one party claimed a trade usage that
these were to be treated as “mere estimates.”); Nanakuli Paving and Rock Co v
Shell Oil Co, Inc, 664 F2d 772 (9th Cir 1981) (alleged custom related to the
price).
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limitations on remedies. Nevertheless, even if courts looked to
custom primarily to fill gaps when remote contingencies arose, this
is precisely the type of situation in which incorporation is likely to
yield the least desirable results. The more remote or unforeseeable a
contingency, the less likely it is that there is an established customary
practice covering it. Moreover, even if such a custom did exist, one
would want to subject it to particularly exacting scrutiny. Assume for
a moment, as the Code does, that customs are Hayekian in nature,
gradually emerging over time from transactors’ independent
158
choices. Now consider how a pair of transactors will decide to act
when a remote contingency arises. In such a situation, each
transactor will reason that the likelihood that this situation will arise
again is, by definition, remote, so that even if she is a buyer one day
and a seller the next, she should fight for the outcome that gives her
the greatest share of the pie today, rather than the outcome that
159
will, over time, maximize the size of the pie. As a consequence, to
156

Ore & Chemical Corp, 455 F Supp at 1152 (where a battle of the forms
issue turned on whether or not provisions in the plaintiffs confirmation
dealing with “payment, loading Incoterms [Paris plus supplement]” were usages
of trade); Union Building Materials Corp v Haas and Haynie Corp, 577 F2d 568,
571 (9th Cir 1978) (whre the alleged usage related to the terms of payment,
specifically “whether the payment made to the subcontractor for materials
delivered but not yet installed should include a proportion of the total overhead
and profit for the job”).
157
Western Ind, Inc v Newcor Canada Ltd, 739 F2d 1198, 1201 (7th Cir
1984) (discussing an alleged “custom of the specialty welding machine trade not
to give a disappointed buyer his consequential damages but just to allow him
either to return the machines and get his money back or (for example if the
breach consists in delivering them late) keep the machines and get the purchase
price reduced to compensate for the costs of delay”); Posttape Associates v
Eastman Kodak Co, 450 F Supp 407, 410 (E D Penn 1978) (discussing “a trade
usage limiting a commercial buyers remedy to replacement of the negligently
manufactured film”).
158
See note XX and accompanying text (discussing Hayek’s views on the
evolution of custom).
159
If, however, the happening of the contingency and the way it is dealt
with by these transactors are observable to members of the relevant market, a
transactor concerned about her reputation might act in the most advantageous
way that will be regarded as “fair.” Alternatively, a single very general custom
such as “share the loss” might evolve to deal with large groups of unforeseen
contingencies, but again there is no reason to think that this allocation of
losses will create desirable incentives. Nevertheless, unforeseen contingencies,
at least in domestic merchant industries, are quite rare since most trade rules
cover adverse weather, labor, transportation, and financial events, making most
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the extent that patterns of practices dealing with remote
contingencies arise, they may favor stronger or particular types of
firms.
The review of these Code cases also suggests that the limits of
language were unlikely to have been a significant barrier to
transactors’ memorializing the asserted usages in written provisions.
In none of the cases surveyed did either party have any difficulty
160
expressing the content of the usage in clear terms. Moreover, the
codification debates contain no indication that there were rules that
drafters would have liked to include, but that could not be adequately
161
expressed in words. In addition, when the lumber industry
remaining unforeseen contingencies quite remote.
160
It is, however, important to note that the cost of capturing a usage i n
writing ex ante is likely to be higher than the cost of giving it content ex post;
and the cost of giving it content ex post need only be incurred if the
relationship breaks down and the parties disagree about its content. In addition,
an ex ante provision memorializing a usage might have to be more complex
than an articulation of a custom ex post since it might have to cover numerous
preconditions and situations that would be irrelevant ex post. If, however,
complexity and nuance are to be invoked as reasons not to memorialize the
usage in a contract, but to nevertheless incorporate it as an enforceable part of
an agreement, it is important to note that as the complexity of and number of
contextual preconditions to a usage increase, the likelihood that there is
reasonably widespread consensus about its content, and that its content can be
accurately determined by a court, decreases. In addition, there are unrecognized
costs of not capturing the usage in writing ex ante, such as a greater risk of
misunderstanding and subsequent transaction breakdown, as well as the costs of
the overly-high or overly-low precautions that the transactors might take if
they do not clearly understand their obligations.
161
The only possible exceptions are the debates relating to grades. While
the limits of language were not invoked as reasons for the inability to arrive at
a consensus over how to memorialize the description of a particular grade in a
rule, and most associations either promulgated standardized written
descriptions of quality—see, for example, Grades of Hay and Straw Established by
the National Hay Association, Inc., in NHA, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Annual
Convention 161 (1921) (“No. 1 Timothy hay—Shall be timothy containing not
more than one-eigth clover or other tame grasses, bright color, sweet, sound
and well baled.”)—or relied on descriptions provided by the government—see
Official United States Standards for Grain, 7 CFR Part 810 (1998)—the fact that
rules expressed in words could not ensure uniform grading given the
subjectivity of the determinations that had to be made was an implicit theme of
the debates. Nevertheless, this subjectivity did not lead the associations to direct
arbitrators to incorporate custom on the question of quality. Rather, most trade
rules provided for quality disputes to be resolved by wiseman-like
intermediaries, some run by the industry, as in the green coffee industry—see
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newsletter reported arbitration decisions in cases arising from a
disagreement about “custom of the trade,” the case report would
frequently be accompanied by a suggested contract clause that could
be used to avoid misunderstandings in the future. These clauses did
162
not typically include linguistically complex formulations. Finally,
for example, Green Coffee Association of New York City, Inc, Rules of
Arbitration (1989); ATMI and ACSA, Southern Mill Rules, Rules 43-44 at 18
(cited in note 27) —and some run by the government, as in the grain industry
by the Federal Grain Inspection Service. For an overview of the program, see
Tuttle v Missouri Dept of Agriculture, 1999 US App LEXIS 5445.
It is, however, important to note that, wholly apart from the inability to
fully capture grade categories in words, there were a number of other possible
reasons for using separate quality intermediaries. First, to the extent that
quality determinations are more subjective than rulings on other aspects of
contractual performance, the use of a separate quality intermediary might be
designed to guard against arbitral bias. Most rules governing industry-run
quality arbitration tribunals contain procedural safeguards against bias that are
not used in regular arbitrations for breach of contract, such as not telling the
arbitrators the names of the parties. See, for example, Green Coffee
Association of New York City, Inc, Rules of Arbitration R VII(I), VIII (1989).
Second, because disagreements about quality are likely to arise even if everyone
is acting in good faith, the availability of a tribunal that can objectively make
this determination even before an action for breach is instituted should help
promote cooperation. In practice, the use of a quality intermediary, particularly
in those industries where the assessment of quality is subjective, is not
particularly damaging to commercial relationships as long as recourse to it is
not too frequent, perhaps because transactors understand that two people acting
in good faith might have different assessments of quality. Interview with
Cotton Merchant (July 1996) (on file with author). Finally, the use of quality
certification intermediaries may promote settlements in disputes where breach
of contract for delivering improper quality is alleged. Having a wiseman
determine quality effectively bifurcates the arbitration. With the issue of
liability clear, and damages under these rules being determined using objective
measures that do not require the revelation of firm-specific information—see
Bernstein, Value Creation (cited in note XX) (noting the damage rules of the
cotton industry and many other industries do not require the revelation of
firm-specific information).
162
See, for example, NAWLA, Make this Test!, North Coast Weekly
Letter No 217 (April 6, 1926) (“Where lumber is bought at certain prices ‘less
5%’ the usual clauses used are found to be ambiguous and lead to unnecessary
controversies at times. In order to comply with the usual custom in such cases
and avoid misunderstanding, the following clause is suggested: . . . ‘Prices are
f.o.b. mill; underweights to mill; less 5% after deducting actual freight.’”);
NAWLA, Questions and Answers, North Coast Weekly Letter No 225 (June
22, 1926) (“[T]he term ‘a carload’ is broad indeed and its interpretation by
different persons and under different conditions leads to much trouble. The
following qualifying clauses are suggested to avoid misunderstanding: Clause
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even if it is linguistically difficult to capture particular aspects of the
desired performance in words, the incorporation of trade usage may
not be a desirable response. The Code requires the content of a
163
usage to be established as “fact,” something that it is difficult to do
if the custom cannot be adequately expressed in words. As a
consequence, it might be better to encourage transactors to include a
wise-man provision in their contracts, designating an industry expert
who will make the necessary determinations in the event of a
dispute. If the wise-man’s determinations were made binding in any
litigated disputes, the wiseman would, in effect, function as a
164
privately contracted-for merchant jury.
As regards the Code’s premise that merchants in fact consider
usages to be fully part of their agreement, this the case studies of the
incorporation debates, together with the text of trade rules, articles
from the trade press, merchant testimony on the proposed Code,
and the modern adjudicative approaches of many merchant
tribunals, suggest that merchants did not view written and
unwritten custom, much less unwritten custom and written
contract provisions, as being on par with one another.
First, not all customs were included in the trade rules. This
suggests that some were viewed as suitable or desirable for third165
party enforcement while others were not. Second, some rules, like
No. 50: ‘Load between 25,000’ and 30,000’ on this order.’ Clause No. 51: ‘Not
over __ M ft.’”).
163
UCC § 1-205(2) (“The existence and scope of . . . a usage are to be
proved as facts” by the litigant, who must then apply it to the circumstances of
the case.).
164
Llewellyn’s early drafts of the Code contained a merchant jury provision
that would have permitted the submission of many types of determinations to
merchant experts whose decisions would be finding at trial. See XX.
165
In addition, the records of inter-association debates relating to
amendments to the Southern Mill Rules, a set of rules governing cotton
transactions between merchants and mills that are jointly drafted by the
American Cotton Shippers Association (“ACSA”), a trade association of
merchants, and the American Textile Manufacturers Association (“ATMI”), a
trade association of mills, suggest that there were practices each association was
willing to encourage its members to abide by, but that they refused to include i n
the rules as legally enforceable obligations. See, for example, Minutes of the 1990
ACSA/ATMI Joint Meeting 3 (June 19, 1990) (while the ATMI rejected a
proposed ACSA rule dealing with sample approvals, the “ATMI did agree to
notify its members regarding shippers’ concerns with sample approvals”);
Minutes of Joint ACSA-ATMI Meeting 4 (June 8-9, 1981) (unpublished
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the WSRs, explicitly distinguished between written and unwritten
166
custom in their hierarchy of authority for interpreting contracts.
Third, the trade press in various industries is filled with statements
that a practice may be customary but that those who want it to be
followed should include a provision to that effect in their
167
contract. Fourth, in the rare instances that early trade codes
contained provisions directing arbitrators to take custom into
account, a choice of custom provision was often included in the
168
rule. The inclusion of such provisions suggests that merchants
recognized that customs varied from locality to locality. Fifth, there
is a great deal of evidence that the practices that some industry
participants described as customs were viewed by others as
undesirable practices that ought to be changed, not as ideal, implicit
169
contract provisions. Sixth, when testifying on the proposed Code,
document, on file with author) (noting that “ATMI rejected any change in the
rules [relating to rejections], but advised that they would ask ATMI members
to handle rejections in a more expeditious manner.”).
166
See note 98 and accompanying text.
167
See, for example, Pacific Coast Shippers Association (“PCSA”), The
Secretary’s Weekly Letter No 82 (July 24, 1923) (“When a wholesaler orders
lumber from an inland mill for delivery at a port for shipment by water, while
it is customary for such shipments to be loaded on open equipment, it is not
obligatory on the part of the mill who is allowed to use any available equipment
unless it is specifically stated on the order that stock must be loaded on open
equipment.”).
168
See, for example, Rule 5, 11 WWGT 36 (1921-22) (“[B]illing
instructions must be furnished the Railroad Company in accordance with the
custom then in vogue at the shipping point.”). See also ASTA, 1955 Yearbook
193 (1955) (“In the absence of any specific stipulation in the contract of sale or
purchase applying to the type of package or packaging, it will be presumed that
the custom prevailing in the area of production will apply.”). But see Trade
Rules of the Grain Dealers National Association Rule 36(e), 10 WWGT 40 (Nov.
20, 1920-21) (requiring brokers to negotiate “in accordance with the rules and
customs governing such transactions”). Similarly, when answering questions
involving custom, the NGFA was also careful to specify which locality’s
custom governs. See Secretary’s Book (1903) (no pagination in original) (when the
Trade Rules committee was asked, “[s]hould a receiver charge seller
commission on grain failing to grade to contract when shipper orders
elsewhere,” it “recomm[ended] that the usage of the market to which the grain
may have been consigned shall govern”).
169
See for example, notes 125 and 127 and accompanying text (silk);
ASTA, ASTA Yearbook 30-31 (1910) (“I wish to call your attention to a custom
that prevails among the Seed Trade, and which seems entirely unnecessary. It
is the long term Credit on Garden Seed. There really is no reason for this
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merchants took the position that even practices that were almost
universally followed in day-to-day relationships should not
necessarily be written into law. For example, merchants
acknowledged the practice of giving a price adjustment for
nonconforming tender, but argued strongly for retention of the
perfect tender rule, explaining that “the price adjustments that
merchants made when goods ‘are not entirely up to standard’—the
give and take of ordinary mercantile life’—should not be made
170
obligatory in the law.”
Finally, modern merchant tribunals are, for the most part, very
171
wary of taking unwritten custom into account in deciding cases.
custom . . . . This is a relic of the old days, and out of line with present day
business methods, and is well worthy of your serious consideration,” noting
that the custom may survive because it gives the “well established house a little
advantage that his newer competitor finds hard to meet.”). However, simple
cognitive bias towards doing things in the traditional way may also have played
a role in locking in traditional practices. See, for example, Misuse of Order Bill
of Lading: Shippers Should Stop Improper Practices—Following Old Customs
Without Knowing Why, 10 WWGT 30 (Feb 20, 1921-22) (“[M]any shippers
are following a custom which has prevailed for years without knowing why or
having any good reason for doing so. In many cases, the shipping clerk is
merely following precedent without knowing why.”). See also text
accompanying note 127 (silk).
170
Wiseman, 100 Harv L Rev at 526 (cited in note 4) (emphasis i n
original). In arguing for the perfect tender rule, merchants explained that the
type of buyer opportunism made possible by the rule, could “take care of [itself]
‘mighty quick’ through other merchant practices.” Id. In sum, “in the
merchants view, the combination of the perfect tender rule and nonlegal
sanctions was more advantageous than a rule of substantial performance with
judicial discretion.” Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1801 (cited in note 13).
171
See Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1801 (cited in note 13); Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law at 10-11 (cited in note 13).
In the early days of their operation, however, these merchant tribunals
looked to custom more often. There are a number of possible explanations for
the initial use of and gradual abandonment of incorporating custom for any
purpose other than filling a pure contractual gap. First, even in the past,
customs were not typically looked to for the purposes of varying terms or
defining the meaning of written provisions, but rather to fill gaps. Because
many early sets of rules were less detailed than modern trade rules, and written
contracts tended to be less complete, perhaps because most firms were small and
more trade was local and personal, there were more gaps to be filled. See No
Change in Rules, 20 WWGT 34 (Nov 30, 1930-31) (“I have been chairman of
the Rules Committee for a number of years and it is very noticeable that
suggestions for changes and inquiries for interpretation are becoming fewer
each year. It is possible that this may be because my opinions are not of value,
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Although they will sometimes look to it when faced with a true
contractual gap, they have a much narrower conception of a gap
than courts applying the Code, and they will almost never look to
custom to interpret or vary a provision in a written contract or
172
memoranda. In those instances when industry expert arbitrators
do look to customs, they sometimes signal their discomfort by
criticizing the contracting practices of the parties. More generally,
merchants appear to have a clear sense that practices will often vary
from contract provisions, sometimes in systematic and sometimes in
relationship-specific ways, but that these variations should be left to
the extralegal realm for their enforcement and are essentially
173
irrelevant to any dispute requiring third party adjudication.
The Code’s incorporation strategy has also been defended on
but I prefer to believe that it is because of a constantly increasing understanding
of the mutual obligations and customs over different sections of the country,
and through the Grain and Feed Dealers National Association a uniform and
fair interpretation of rules and custom.”). Second, in the early years more trade
was local in scope, so those local customs that did exist may have been a sound
basis for deciding cases. It is, however, important to exercise caution i n
drawing a straight inference that because merchant tribunals rejected
incorporation, the public commercial law should as well. Merchant associations
have institutional alternatives available to help solve the problems of contractual
incompleteness that are unavailable in the public legal system. They can
promulgate multiple sets of trade codes, carefully tailored to different types of
transactions, as well as standard-form contracts that are even more closely
tailored to particular contexts. In addition, they can draw on pre-existing forces
of shaming and social suasion to encourage and discourage particular types of
behavior, forces that are unavailable to either courts or to many of the
industries whose contractual relations are governed by the Code. See, for
example, Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J Legal Stud 115, XX (1992); Bernstein,
Value Creation at 16-25 (cited in note 13). However, because merchants
testifying on the proposed Code sharply criticized the incorporation
strategy—see notes 142 and 143 and accompanying text—the fact that most of
their private legal systems reject this strategy is nonetheless quite telling.
172
Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev 1765, 1775-81 (cited in note 13). The
NGFA arbitrators also do not permit custom to trump trade rules, even though
the rules are said to be based on customary practices. See, for example, Texas
Farm Products v Topeka Mill and Elevator Co, NGFA Case No 1507 (Mar 31,
1970) (“[W]hile trade practices in the Kansas City area may differ in accepted
meaning of terminology” from the practices in Texas, “this does not relieve the
Seller from complying with Rule 38 unless so specified in writing”). See also
note 215.
173
For an extensive discussion of this point and supporting evidence, see
Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1777 n 43 (cited in note 13).
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the grounds that, at least as regards the gap-filling use of custom,
customs are likely to be more efficient than any term the court can
construct. The strength of this argument, however, depends
strongly on acceptance of the strong-form Hayekian view of the
evolution of custom that implicitly animates the Code, a view that
suggests that efficient custom should evolve through the natural
174
selection of rules and practices. This is, however, a view of custom
175
that Hayek himself doubted in its purest form, and that seems
increasingly untenable in light of the insights of modern game
theory and cognitive psychology. Game theory makes clear that
regularities in behavior can emerge from sets of circumstances vastly
different from those envisioned by Hayek. For example, customs
may reflect the unique or non-unique equilibria that that are
produced by interactions characterized by any of a number of games.
These equilibria may or may not be efficient. Their evolution may
also be highly path-dependant and strongly influenced by
176
177
information cascades or any of a number of heuristic biases.
174

See Friedrich A. Hayek, 1 Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Rules and Order
35-54, 74-91 (Chicago 1973). However, Hayek himself recognizes that rules
arising from an evolutionary process may “develop in very undesirable
directions, and . . . when this happens correction by deliberate legislation,”
may be “the only practicable way out.” Id at 88.
175
Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty Vol I: Rules and Order
100-01 (Chicago 1973) (where Hayek notes that for the best rules to emerge
both the evolutionary forces, of spontaneous order, and the actions of courts
and legislature are all necessary, explaining that “the system of rules as a whole
. . . is the outcome of evolution in the course of which spontaneous growth of
customs and deliberate improvements of the particulars of an existing system
have consistently interacted. It is the outcome of a process of evolution in the
course of which spontaneous growth of customs and deliberate improvements of
the particulars of an existing system have constantly interacted.”).
176
See David Hirshleifer, The blind leading the blind: Social influence, fads,
and informational cascades, reprinted in Mariano Tommasi and Kathryn I.
Lerulli, eds, The new economics of human behavior 188, 191 (Cambridge 1995)
(“[A]n informational cascade occurs when the information implicit i n
predecessors’ actions (or resulting payoffs) is so conclusive that a rational
follower will unconditionally imitate them, without regard to information from
other sources . . . [C]ascades often spontaneously develop on the basis of very
little information. People converge on one action quite rapidly, and their
decisions are idiosyncratic.”). Because information cascades arise when people
give relatively large weight to the behavior they observe around them,
information cascades may well explain the existence of highly localized
customary practices that differ widely from locality-to-locality in ways that
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Although game theory also suggests that the usages reflected in
some of these types of equilibria are unstable and can therefore be
changed easily if they are thought to be undesirable, there are a
number of forces that operate on commercial practices, including
both the heuristic biases that helped create them as well as
coordination problems and interpretive, educational, and
178
enforcement-related network externalities, that make it less likely
cannot be explained purely in terms of transactional differences or other
efficiency related criteria. See President Clement, 10 WWGT 25 (Apr 5, 192122) (outside of the context of a particular dispute, how the terms prompt, quick,
and immediate are defined when transactors are given a menu of time
provisions to choose from has no distributional consequences). Although the
theory of informational cascades shows that the results of the cascades are
vulnerable to change, commercial customs established by cascades are subject to
the same lock-in forces as other commercial customs, and in practice are
therefore less likely to change in response to the introduction of new
information than the models would suggest.
177
See, for example, Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Path Dependence
in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases,
74 Wash U L Q 347 (1996) (discussing how cognitive biases, including the
status quo bias, the endowment effect, anchoring bias, conformity bias, and
herd behavior, influence contracting decisions and reinforce recourse to
standard written terms). Transactors may be particularly wary of suggesting
departures from custom in markets where such suggestions are rare, since the
relational costs of doing so are likely to be particularly high.
178
Interpretative network externalities are the benefits created by the fact
that, as compared to the meaning of a specially-drafted provision, the meaning
of a widely used contractual provision is likely both to be clearer (since it has
already been interpreted by courts) and to become clearer over time (because it
will be more likely to be interpreted by courts in future disputes). See generally
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
Va L Rev 757 (1995). An educational network externality is the increased
certainty and reduced chance of misunderstanding and transaction breakdown
that result from using the standard terms provided by the trade rules, terms that
trade associations go to great lengths to explain to their members and that
receive wide coverage in the trade press. See text accompanying note XX. The
enforcement network benefit follows from the interpretive and educational
network benefits. When most market transactors understand a term, and the
violation of that term is either observable to market participants or can be
credibly revealed to them at moderate cost, multilateral reputation sanctions can
be imposed on the breacher. These sanctions depend for their effectiveness on
widespread consensus about the standard used to assess whether or not behavior
was proper. In contrast, unusual terms, whether written or unwritten, are
backed primarily by legal sanctions, bilateral reputation sanctions (most
commonly termination of trade), and some negative gossip. This, in turn,
creates a preference for standardized legal and extralegal terms.
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than game theory standing alone would predict that trade practices,
whether written or unwritten, that survive for a certain period of
179
time are going to change.
Moreover, even if customs did arise through Hayekian-type
natural selection, there is no reason to think that they would provide
180
desirable, legally enforceable contract provisions. In the absence of
an authority who stands ready to promulgate and enforce them, a
custom will develop only if it was first a practice that was followed
181
by a pair of transactors who found it in their best interest to do so.
The first time the practice was followed, it would have been legally
unenforceable since it would be neither a course of performance nor
a course of dealing. As a consequence, the practice could only
182
condition on information that was observable to the transactors.
Without the threat of legal compulsion,183a practice that conditioned
on information that was only verifiable, that is, a practice whose
179
Indeed, the trade press and association records in many industries
suggest that it was extraordinarily difficult to change custom, see note 127 and
accompanying text, and that customs that no longer made even a modicum of
business sense were often followed. Misuse of Order Bill of Lading, 10 WWGT
30 (Feb 20, 1920-21) (“A great many shippers are following a custom which
has prevailed for years without knowing why or having any good reason for
doing so. In many cases, the shipping clerk is merely following precedent
without knowing why.”).
180
See Posner (cited in note XX).
181
However, it is possible that under the Code a practice that came into
being by conditioning only on observable information, might, as it evolved
first into a course of performance, then into a course of dealing, and finally
into a custom, come to condition on information that was a verifiable proxy for
the observable information that the practice originally conditioned on. This
process of transformation would likely be accelerated by parties’ attempts to
enforce these practices in court, since in each dispute the parties would be
required to adduce verifiable information in support of their claim. As a custom
comes increasingly to condition on verifiable information, unless the
observability conditions concurrently survive the evolution, the cooperationpromoting aspect of the custom will begin to disintegrate.
182
Observable information is information that the transactors themselves
can obtain at the relevant time at a cost they regard as reasonable ex ante. The
observability of a condition may change over the life of a contracting
relationship as the transactors learn about one anothers’ operations, thereby
expanding, overtime, the extra-legally contractible aspects of the deal.
183
Verifiable information is information that transactors would, ex ante,
view as both possible and financially desirable to prove to a third-party in the
event a dispute arose. Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An
Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J Legal Stud 271,
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applicability could only be determined by a third-party who could
compel the parties to reveal information, would not be workable. So
even if customs were perfect Hayekian customs that arose from the
force of natural selection operating on practices, there is no reason to
expect them to be the optimal legally enforceable contract provisions
or necessarily better provisions than a court could construct using
184
any of a number of interpretive methods.
More generally, both the Code’s incorporation strategy and the
dominant evolutionary views of the emergence of custom are based
on the same curious assumption. Namely, if most transactors in a
market could costlessly arrive at and draft a term governing an issue,
they would likely arrive at the same term, the customary term.
Nevertheless, in many, if not most, contractual settings, this
assumption is likely to be false. Transactors are likely to have
different perceived trade-offs between price and other terms,
different abilities to use slightly imperfect goods, different abilities to
finance their cash gap, and different risk preferences. There is no
reason to suppose that, given these differences, all transactors would

279 (1992). Some observable information is also verifiable, but not all verifiable
information is observable.
184
The preference for contract over unwritten custom in trade associations
is, however, influenced by considerations that may play out differently in the
legal arena. While unwritten customs are subject to the lock-in forces and other
cognitive distortions discussed in the text, most of these forces also operate i n
largely the same way on written contractual provisions in industries without
trade rules or centrally drafted contractual forms. See Klausner (cited in note
178). The only difference is that written provisions containing customary
understandings can initially condition on verifiable information. If one
thought that lock-in forces caused more inefficiency in written terms then
unwritten terms, it might be desirable to interpret written provisions by
reference to unwritten custom as the Code directs. If, however, one though that
unwritten customs were more subject to these forces, it would be undesirable to
look to them unless faced by an unambiguous gap. In trade associations,
however, the trade rules-creation and amendment processes, and the widespread
use of association-drafted standard forms, means that written contractual
provisions can be more readily changed and are less subject to lock-in forces
than are both unwritten custom and perhaps written contracts in nonassociation dominated markets. Indeed, the decision of trade associations to
create written sets of trade rules might be understood as an efficiency enhancing
institutional response to problems inherent in the evolution of both custom
and individually drafted contracts. See Bernstein, Private Commercial Law at
28-30 (draft on file with U Chi L Rev) (cited in note 13).
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185

choose the same contractual provisions. Indeed, even in cashcommodity sales that are relatively standard as compared to many of
the transactions governed by the Code, trade rules typically offer
transactors a menu of possible terms for each core aspect of their
186
trade.
Moreover, the Code’s incorporation strategy reflexively
incorporates customs into all contracts in a market, unless the
187
customs are clearly and specifically negated, and looks to customs
to interpret even explicit and facially unambiguous contract
188
provisions. It thereby moves the meaning of explicit provisions as
185

In addition, it is likely that transactors in a given market will have more
defined transaction types in their mind than a court, and how exactly the court
defines the type of transaction perceived to be at issue may, as Craswell has
argued, be outcome determinative. Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist? at XX
(cited in note 8). Yet it is quite likely that this is the type of determination a
court will get wrong. Consider a contract between a merchant-seller of cotton
and a mill-buyer. There are many mills that produce a variety of goods,
depending on the demand of their customers. Suppose the mill sometimes
makes sheets, and that when it does it is terribly important that a particular
quality of cotton is used. Other times it makes denim, a production process
where quality is much less important. A court attempting to find a trade custom
relating to the permissible quality variation might well aggregate over both
types of transactions, yet one would not expect the optimal amount of quality
variation to be the same in contracts for goods to produce sheets as in contracts
for goods to produce denim. Or, consider a contract for the sale of silk. A court
might not distinguish between a contract for silk to be used to make gloves and
other types of silk, yet in the silk trade, when it comes to payment time, the
difference is outcome determinative. Compare Standard Rules of the Silk Glove
Group, Rule 4, in Organization of Glove Silk Group, 2 Silkworm 17 (March
1921) (“Shipment made within one week after specified date of delivery shall
constitute good delivery.”) (emphasis added) with Broad Silk Rules Adopted, 2
Silkworm 10 (January 1921) (“Rule 5 . . . shipment made within two weeks
after specified date of delivery shall constitute a good delivery.”) (emphasis
added).
186
See, for example, NGFA, Trade Rules and Arbitration Rules, Grain
Trade R 8 (“Time of Shipment or Delivery”) (1995) (defining a selection of time
designations including “immediate,” “quick,” “prompt,” and “first half of the month
shipment”); id R 4A (defining several weight classifications to choose from); id R 4B
(defining several types of inspection).
187
UCC § 2-202 cmt 2 (“Unless carefully negated [usages of trade] have
become an element of the meaning of the words used.”). In addition, because
the duty of good faith cannot be “disclaimed by agreement,” id at § 1-102(3),
and because the Comment notes that the good faith requirement is to be
“implemented by Section 1-205 on course of dealing and usage of trade,”
contracting out of trade usage is quite difficult. Id at § 1-203 cmt.
188
Nanakuli Paving and Rock Co v Shell Oil Co, 664 F2d 772, XX (9th Cir
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close as possible to the meaning of customary terms, and in so
doing transforms many customary practices into quasi-mandatory
1981) (where a contract for the sale of asphalt contained an explicit provision
that states that the seller’s posted price at the time of delivery would govern, the
buyer’s claim that it was entitled to “price protection”—a usage of trade in the
asphalt-paying trade in Hawaii that required the seller to sell at the original
price all the asphalt that the buyer had committed to use in jobs on which it
had already bid in reliance on the sellers price, and the court found that seller
was bound by this usage). See also Columbia Nitrogen Corp v Royster Co, 451
F2d 3, 7 (4th Cir 1971) (holdoing that, despite express price and quantity terms
and a standard integration clause, evidence to show that it was a custom and
usage of the fertilizer industry that ‘express price and quantity terms i n
contracts for material . . . are mere projections,” was admissible to establish a
consistent, additional enforceable term in the parties’ agreement). See, for
example, Sherrock v Commercial Credit Corp, 277 A2d 708, 711 (Del Super
1971), revd on other grounds, 290 A2d 648 (Del Super 1972) (finding buyer to
be a merchant buyer and therefore obligated to follow reasonable commercial
standards in the trade, and holding that the buyer’s decision to pay early and let
seller retain possession for several days thereafter was not in accordance with
the custom of the automobile trade and was unreasonable, explaining that
“departures from customary usages and commercial practices should be viewed
as strong indicia that the practice is not reasonable”).
189
Llewellyn’s preference for moving the meanings of terms and
obligations as close as practicable to their customary meaning is amply reflected
in the legislative history of the Code. In a comment on a proposed Draft of the
Code, Llewellyn wrote:
No inconsistency of language and background exists merely because the
words used mean something different to an outsider than they do to the
merchants who used that language in the light of the commercial
background against which they contracted. This is the necessary result of
applying commercial standards and principles of good faith to the
agreement . . . . Moreover, where the commercial background normally
gives to a term some breadth of meaning so that it describes a range of
acceptable tolerances rather than razor sharp-edged single line of action,
any attempted narrowing of this meaning by one party is so unusual as not
likely to be expected or perceived by the other. Therefore, attention must b e
called to a desire to contract at material variance from the accepted commercial
pattern of contract or use of language. Thus, this Act rejects any “surprise
variation from fair and normal meaning of agreement.”
Cited in Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary
Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68
Tex L Rev 169, 200.
For a careful discussion of the jurisprudential inseparability of the Code’s
duty of good faith, its reliance on usage, and its definition of agreement, which
traces the evolution of these ideas in Llewellyn’s thought and through drafts of
the Code, see id at 199-202. See also Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at XX (cited
in note YY).
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standardized provisions in all contracts in the relevant market.

It

190
Although the incorporation strategy implicitly treats many customs as
terms in standard-form contracts, often referred to as contracts of adhesion,
customs do not, for the most part engender similar distrust. But see Danzig,
Jurisprudence of the UCC at 626-27 (cited in note 6). Although many of the
objections to standard-form contracts are untenable from an economic point of
view, these objections are widely accepted, so it is important to note that they
provide an even stronger ground for objecting to implicit, customary, standardform contract provisions.
The two main grounds for distrust of standardized contracts, are “[f]irst,
[that] most persons presented with standardized forms do not bother to
familiarize themselves with the specific content,” and “second, [that] because
the advantages of forms would be lost if bargains were open to routine
renegotiation, their users are often unwilling to do business on other than
standard terms.” Avery Weiner-Katz, Standard Form Contracts, in The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (1998). Both of these concerns are
even more problematic in relation to custom. First, the per transaction cost to a
transactor of reading a standard-form contract drafted by someone he does
business with frequently is small in comparison to learning all of the practices
in vogue in the other transactor’s market. Indeed the cost, difficulty, and bother
of learning the practices of numerous localities was a major impetus behind the
drafting of national grain rules. Trade Rules in Danger?, 13 WWGT at 28
(cited in note 67) (“No buyer can possibly keep up with all the rules and
regulations of all the shipping markets of the country That’s why the National
rules were formulated.”). The sometimes costly efforts that trade associations
make to educate their members about the content of rules and customs suggests
that even the easily accessible rules are not that widely known. See 11 WWGT
35 (1921-22) (“There has never been an annual report of an arbitration
committee that did not point out the lack of knowledge of the trade rules shown
by the rank and file of the members.”). Moreover, small merchants are less
likely than large transactors to know the content of commercial customs
(particularly those outside of their immediate area), in part because custom is
learned through observation of, and participation in, transactions and smaller
transactors participate in fewer transactions. See, for example, NHA, Report of
the Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention 86 (1921) (defending the retention of a
written rule on reshipment, on the grounds that “the small country shipper is
usually not well posted on rules and customs and the association should very
carefully guard his interests. The man of broader experience is usually well
informed and is entirely capable of looking after his own interest but not so
with the smaller shipper who innocently trusts his business to a market”).
Second, transactors are likely to find it undesirable, and perhaps difficult, to
persuade others to do business on terms that radically depart from custom or
commercial standards. Because transactors who propose to transact on explicitly
noncustomary terms are likely to be viewed with suspicion, their proposals are
likely to be met with counter proposals, so the relational costs of even
proposing a departure from custom might be high and the associated risk of
transaction breakdown significant. See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and
Default Rules Analysis, 1 S Cal Interdisc L J 59, 69-73 (1994).

61

Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy

also prevents transactors from actually following a custom that they
perceive as a desirable, legally unenforceable practice, but undesirable
legally enforceable contract provision, because if they follow the
custom on more than one occasion, it would likely be transformed
into a legally binding course of dealing or course of performance. In
addition, if there are, in fact, customs that cannot be linguistically
captured in a contract provision ex ante, the incorporation strategy
transforms them into mandatory terms because in order to be
191
excluded, the contract must negate them with specificity,
something that by assumption is not possible.
Conclusion. In sum, the incorporation strategy is based on an
overly broad conception of the types and geographical scope of
customs that consistently exist in merchant communities. However,
even if one believes that some customs do exist, support for the
incorporation strategy in merchant industries would not necessarily
follow. In most merchant industries, transactions are consummated
orally and confirmed by sending standard-form memoranda with
long, back-of-the-page printed recitals. In such contexts, those
customary understandings that truly do exist could easily and
inexpensively be memorialized in standard-form boiler-plate. In
other words, the number of customs that are clearly enough defined
and widely enough known to be true implicit contract provisions,
but that are nonetheless not worth including in contractual boilerplate, is likely to be quite small.
Nevertheless, because the concept of custom seems to retain
some salience to merchants—who use it variously to describe their
own past contracting practices or the loose distribution of
contractual behavior in the market as a whole—it is useful to explore
in more detail the role played by the notion of commercial custom in
merchant relationships.
III. THE RE LATIONSHI P -CR EATING RO LE OF CUST OM
The empirical evidence presented in Part I casts doubt on the
systematic existence of industry-wide unwritten customs that are
generally known, geographically co-extensive with the scope of
trade, and implicitly assented to by market transactors. It also
191

See note 187.
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substantiates the likely existence of some local customs as well as
some relatively common industry-wide practices. More generally,
however, the evidence strongly suggests that the types of customs
that exist, even in these rather well-defined merchant communities,
do not amount to anything close to the all-pervasive sets of implicit
gap-filling provisions and dictionary-type interpretive guides
assumed by the Code.
Nevertheless, while merchants do not, for the most part,
conceive of customs as providing them with legally enforceable
contract terms, most merchants evidence a keen interest in learning
and talking about the way business is usually done in their industry.
One explanation for this interest is that transactors approach
transactions, particularly those with a stranger, with a rough sense,
derived from aggregating behavior over the market as a whole, of the
192
way such deals are usually concluded and performed.
These
aggregations (or distributions) of behavior, which might be termed
weak-form customs, play an important role in the development of
commercial relationships. This role can best be understood by
drawing on the insights produced by basic signaling models and by
recognizing that many merchant-to-merchant commercial
transactions have features that can best be captured by the intuitions
193
underlying repeat-play prisoners’ dilemma models, in which
cooperation is best established and maintained when transactors
194
follow any of a number of tit-for-tat strategies. These strategies
dictate responding to cooperation with cooperation and defection
(or a series of defections) with defection for a defined period of time
followed by a return to cooperation.
192
Alternatively, the customs and commercial standards incorporated by the
Code may actually be important sources of contractual understanding for
smaller merchants who engage in mostly local trade.
193
For an overview of these signaling models that explores their application
to numerous legal issues, see Eric A. Posner, Law, Cooperation and Rational
Choice (DRAFT) (1998) (on file with U Chi L Rev). The discussion here
differs slightly from Posner’s in that the costly action that constitutes the
signal sent by the seller is not a deadweight loss (in the way that burning
money, which would also send the requisite signal, would be a deadweight loss)
because the high quality delivery will benefit the buyer.
194
See Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The
Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday life 113-115 (Norton 1991)
(discussing a variety of tit-for-tat strategies).
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One of the main barriers to both establishing and maintaining
commercial cooperation is that it may be difficult for a transactor to
determine, by simply observing actual outcomes, whether the other
transactor has defected. Making this determination is a difficult and
error-prone process, particularly in merchant industries where the
195
commodity being sold passes through many hands and the quality
of the good is so strongly effected by climactic, storage, and
transportation conditions that even after optimal precautions have
been taken, a significant probability remains that performance will
196
not be exactly as promised. Each time a transactor mistakenly
classifies an outcome as defection, the likelihood that she will
respond by defecting now or in the future increases, making
197
relationship breakdown more likely.
195

For example, a bale of cotton may pass though the hands of a farmer, a
grain elevator operator, a country merchant, a city merchant, a warehouseman,
another city merchant or broker, a transport company (railroad, truck, or
barge), and a mill. See generally Bernstein, Private Commercial Law at XX
(cited in note 13).
196
See, for example, Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 49
(cited in note 56) (“Each step in the marketing chain [of grain] involves
commitments and contracts between two or more parties. The vagaries of
weather and transportation congestion and delays can add further disruptions.
From the simplest grain purchase contract with farmers to complex, multilayered string trades, there is an inherent opportunity for misinterpretation of a
contract term or condition or nonperformance.”); NHA, Report of the Fourth
Annual Meeting 23 (1897) (“[A] shipper may in perfect honesty consign a car
of hay to the receiver under the impression that it is No. 1 hay, and if it proves
to be No. 2 hay, that is not conclusive evidence that the shipper is dishonest.”).
197
Where two transactors are playing a “pure” tit-for-tat strategy, a single
act that is misinterpreted by Transactor 2 as defection will lead him to defect i n
response. This will, in turn, lead Transactor 1 to defect, and cooperation will
disintegrate. In real-world interactions, however, because a “pure” tit-for-tat
strategy is so sensitive to breakdown, game theory suggests that a more
successful strategy would be a modified, more “forgiving” tit-for-tat strategy
that does not dictate responding to every bad outcome (that is every real or
suspected defection) by inflicting a punishment. See Avinash and Dixit,
Thinking Strategically at 113 (cited in note 194). These relatively forgiving
strategies, such as tit-for-two tats, are commonly followed by merchants. See
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law at 57-59 (cited in note 13) (noting that a
strategy of negotiating forgiving adjustments until a relationship is terminated
is common in transactions between cotton merchants and cotton mills; and
noting that a strategy of ignoring defections or making forgiving adjustments
in response to a certain number of defections and responding to defections
thereafter with punishment of a limited variety, such as refusing to deal for a
specified period, and then returning to cooperation, is commonly followed i n
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In order to understand the role played by these weak-form
customs, consider a seller (S) who is dealing with a buyer (B) for the
first time in a market where repeat-dealing relationships, once
established, have an economic advantage over discrete transactions,
perhaps because they reduce cooperation and performance costs as
the transactors learn about one another’s expectations and business
198
operations. Suppose further that at the outset of the relationship
B knows nothing about S. In such a situation, B will assume that if
S is trustworthy (that is, if he is a cooperator) he will perform within
customary bounds on all aspects of the deal, and that if he is not
trustworthy (that is, if he is a defector) his performance will fall
outside these bounds. The contract takes this into account through
the price term. B is willing to pay a price corresponding to the
customary ranges of performance on all aspects of the contract,
weighted by the probability of their occurrence. These customary
ranges roughly, though imperfectly, reflect the aggregate
performances of all transactors in the market and are largely
199
common knowledge to both buyers and sellers.
Suppose, for
example, that quality is the key term in a wheat contract. If the
contract calls for No. 3 Wheat, the weak-form customary range
transactions among merchant members of the Memphis Cotton Exchange).
198
For example, as S learns about B’s business, he can more accurately
assess when slightly nonconforming tender will or will not disrupt the buyer’s
business (if tendered with a price adjustment) and can adjust his precaution
investment accordingly. As one Texas Feed Dealer explained, “I prefer to deal
with old customers since when I ship, I know that the goods will be suitable
and will therefore be accepted even if they are not exactly to contract.”
Interview with Texas Feed Dealer (1999) (on file with author). Similarly, i n
the cotton industry, where mills and merchants have been unable to agree on
rules regarding the unloading of truck shipments—particularly, the hours
receiving stations must operate, the order in which arriving trucks will be
unloaded and graded, etc.—knowing the practices of the mill he is selling to is
very important to the merchant.
199
Although these aggregations of practices are unlikely to supply the
optimal performance ranges for any particular pair of transactors, aggregating as
they do over transactions that likely differed greatly in both purpose and scope,
they may nonetheless be valuable in these early rounds precisely because they
are common knowledge. The element of value created by the fact that they are
common knowledge may outweigh their lack of a tailored fit with the
specifications and error ranges the transactors really desire. B and S should be
equally able to observe aggregate market behavior so weak-form customs should
be a fairly good cooperation initiator. But see note 221.
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would correspond to how often in the market, when a contract calls
for No. 3 Wheat, No. 3 exactly is delivered, how often something
better than No. 3 is delivered, and how often something worse than
200
No. 3 is delivered.
Returning again to B and S. If S’s performance is within the
customary range, B will conclude that S is a cooperator and will
enter into another deal. This will continue as long as S’s
performance is within the customary range and, over time, a pattern
of S’s performance being closer than customary to the desired
performance emerges. In these early stages of the emergent
contractual relationship, S is taking a loss on each contract. He is
taking the level of precaution associated with delivering close to the
promised performance, but is only receiving the price associated with
customary ranges of performance. However, S’s willingness to take
201
this initial loss adds value to the relationship. It is a credible signal
to B that S has a low discount rate—that is, that he plans to
continue to cooperate with B in the future. Over time, if S’s
performance is closer than average to the desired performance, here
the promised quality, B will see this course of dealing (“CD”)
emerge. Gradually, she will come to pay S a higher price to reflect
202
this better performance.
200
Transactors seem to instinctively use these types of ranges to assess
whether the other transactor intended to cooperate or defect. See, for example,
Board Book at 80-81 (cited in note XX) (“Most dealers state on their card bids
that grain missing grade will be taken at market difference on day of arrival,
and I believe that a fair interpretation of this term means that the seller who
accepts must deliver grain of the grade he agrees to, or some so near it i n
quality that he may really expect it to grade. If a person sets up a target, turns
his back to it and shoots in the opposite direction, it cannot reasonably said
that he misses the target, and it is equally true that if a person sells No 2 yellow
corn and delivers corn which inspects No 4 or no grade, it cannot
meaningfully be said that the corn missed grade. This may seem an exaggerated
illustration, but it explains the point.”).
201
Alternatively, S may take the customary level of precaution and deliver
only within the customary range, thereby not incurring any loss in the initial
rounds. In these early rounds, the transactors will still learn about one
another’s operations, giving rise to switching costs, which may facilitate the
creation of a repeat-dealing relationship. However, this method of establishing
a relationship is less likely to succeed than the method discussed into the text,
since S’s behavior in earlier rounds conveys less information about his likely
future behavior to B.
202
During these early rounds of the transactional relationship, the weak-
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Despite the loss he suffers in early rounds, S has confidence
that, once a repeat-dealing relationship is established, B will want to
remain in it and will therefore let S slowly recoup his initial
203
investment. S’s confidence that B will behave this way is rational
because the early rounds of any contracting relationship are costly to
B even though she is paying only the customary price and may, in
fact, be receiving higher than customary quality. Because quality is
important to B, during these initial transactions she may have to
deal with multiple suppliers to ensure she will have the requisite
amount of a particular quality of the commodity on hand.
Alternatively, she may have to keep sufficient inventory on hand to
cover her needs in case the new S delivers towards the low end of
the customary range.
The information transactors learn about one another’s
businesses in these early dealings gradually reduces the coordination
204
and performance costs of dealing with one another, giving rise to
switching costs for both B and S. Once the relationship is
form custom also provides benefits to S. In its absence, and in the absence of
any other agreed range, S would take even more precautions to ensure that
performance was exactly as promised, fearful that B would interpret any
deviation as breach that would trigger a retaliatory response. However, i n
addition to giving B a way to ascertain that the deviation was unlikely to be a
defection, the custom also constrains his behavior. When B rejects goods that
are within customarily acceptable ranges, S can threaten to impose multilateral
reputational sanctions—publicizing B’s action to market transactors who would
likely agree that B’s action was improper. Indeed in the cotton industry, mills
that acquire a reputation for being very inflexible on quality deviations find that
they have to pay more for goods than do mills with a reputation for flexibility.
See, for example, Interview with cotton merchant (date unavailable) (on file
with author) (“Mills get a reputation about how flexible they are when certain
circumstances arise [and] a merchant considers this very valuable business
knowledge, this information about how flexible a mill will be. Some mills are
more stringent about adjustments, and are very strict about demanding exact
conformity to the contract. These mills have to pay more for cotton than mills
who are willing to be more flexible. The market knows.”). Conversely, when B
accepts goods in the customary range even though they are not exactly what he
wants, S is not going to interpret this as acquiescence that lower quality
delivery is “acceptable.” However, the Code provisions that permit contract
modification by course of dealing or course of performance endorse just such an
interpretation of the action.
203
This can be thought of simply as a relationship-specific investment that
will be amortized over time.
204
See XX (cited in note XX).
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established, both transactors therefore have a reason to want to
205
maintain it.
Once B and S establish a relationship-specific CD zone, and
the contract price adjusts both to reflect it and to permit S to recoup
his initial investment, if S’s performance is within this zone it will be
considered cooperation, and if it is outside this zone , or outside of
the zone on several occasions, it will be considered defection. At this
stage of B and S’s contracting relationship there are two kinds of
defection. Defection that is outside the CD zone but within
customary range and defection that is outside even the customary
range.
Defection that is outside the private CD zone but within the
customary range, may, if it is a non-regular occurrence, call for a
price adjustment on the next deal, or some other measured response
such as not dealing for a few rounds. Although the CD zone is
narrower than the customary range, making more outcomes
defection, a CD relationship is actually less vulnerable to breakdown
than a customary one. Because transactors in a CD relationship are
relatively well informed about one another’s operations, they can
more accurately infer whether the other cooperated or defected than
205

Alternatively, even in the absence of either weak-form customs or good
reputation information, cooperation could emerge if a buyer and seller had a
common view of the distribution of outcomes (where an outcome is an actual
completed aspect of the promised performance) after an agreed-upon level of
precaution had been taken. In such a situation, outcomes within the agreed
zone of error, or perhaps within two standard deviations of its mean, would be
considered cooperation. Outcomes outside the zone, or repeated outcomes
outside the zone, would be considered defection. More specifically, if
transactors had a common understanding the error ranges associated with each
aspect of performance after optimal precautions had been taken, if the Code
were to define customary ranges in terms of these random errors, and if courts
too could make these determinations with reasonable accuracy at reasonable
cost, enforcing this “custom” as a term of the contract would be value creating.
It might remove the incentive for S to engage in too high a level of precaution
early in the relationship where a random but large deviation is most costly to
the relationship (either because the relationship-specific background to assess it
has not yet developed, or because it is one of a fewer number of data points on
behavior and so will have larger influence on the transactors’ assessments of
one anothers’ behavior than would a later deviation) and will effectively
constrain opportunism by both B and S. In such a regime, S might try to be
opportunistic by consistently delivering to the low end of the range, but if he
did so B could terminate the relationship.

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

68

can transactors in the early and customary stage of their relationship.
As a consequence, transactors’ responses to outcomes just outside of
a well-established CD zone are more tempered. This intuition is
reflected in the grain poem “If I Knew You and You Knew Me”:
If I knew you and you knew me
‘Tis seldom we would disagree;
But never having yet clasped hands,
Both often fail to understand
That each intends to do what’s right
And treat each other “honor bright.”
How little to complain there’d be
If I knew you and you knew me.
When’er we ship you by mistake,
Or in your bill some error make,
From irritation you’d be free
If I knew you and you knew me.
Or when the checks don’t come on time
And customers send nary a line,
We’d wait without anxiety,
206
If I knew you and you knew me.
In most industries, merchant transactors’ responses to particular
breaches do depend strongly on the identity of and their prior
207
relationship with the breaching party.
In contrast, defection outside the customary range, such as
206

12 WWGT 35 (Jun 20, 1922-23).
NHA, Report of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Convention 55 (1920) (“We
have noted instances of where a shipper would invoice a car as being No. 2
timothy, when as a matter of fact there might be some ‘off’ grade hay. However,
the receiver knowing the shipper and of the conditions under which the hay
was bought and loaded, knew that there would be no trouble over the invoicing
as he knew the shipper was not trying to slip something over on him. Hence
the value of personal relationship between buyer and seller. In other instances
this practice causes a lot of trouble.”). See also E-mail from participant in the
Cotton-L List Serve (One cotton transactor explained that if a transactor asks
to be released from a contract “you have to look at the circumstances for not
providing the cotton (no prices going from 70 to 80 is not acceptable). A
disaster is a disaster. Who you are dealing with is also important, for both
sides. Have you been selling your cotton to this guy for 10 years.”).
207
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either a delivery or a series of deliveries outside the customary range,
is likely to signal defection and to trigger an end-game round—that
is, termination or suspension of the relationship and a resort to
208
arbitration to recover money damages. Moreover, because all
market participants know the loose contours of the customary range,
defections outside of it can also be sanctioned through multilateral
reputation sanctions. These sanctions are only available when a
significant number of market transactors agree that an outcome, or a
series of outcomes, are defection and when the defection or
defections are either observable to many market participants or can
be credibly revealed to them at a reasonable cost by the breached209
against party.
208
Although it is difficult to establish whether or not a dispute is an endgame dispute, in part because even if two agents never deal again, their
companies might still chose to do so, there is nonetheless evidence that i n
some merchant tribunals most cases are end-game disputes. For example,
between 1975 and 1996, 54 percent of the cases heard by the Board of Appeals,
the tribunal that resolves disputes between cotton merchants and cotton mills,
were absolute end-game disputes. The most common triggers of the end-game
were the insolvency or financial distress of a party or the closing of a cotton
office, and the second most common were a change of control of one of the
entities involved, or the retirement of a person directly involved in the
transaction, both events that upset settled expectations. Another 18 percent of
the cases involved disputes that might fairly be classified as end-game. They
involved the effects of a government subsidy program that made large sums
turn on who had possession of cotton on a particular day. These cases were
ones in which an event took the contract out of the self-enforcing range and
made it worthwhile for one of the parties to end their contracting relationship.
The remaining 27 percent of the cases involved primarily factual disputes about
late payment and late delivery. Transactors explained that if they had to take a
case to the Board of Appeals they would be quite unlikely to deal with the other
party again. Bernstein, Private Commercial Law at 46-47 (cited in note 13). See
also NHA, Report of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention 126 (1918) (where the
arbitration report notes that “once a case is brought to the attention of the
Arbitration Committee, the parties concerned will no longer have the
confidence in each other. Their difference begets contradiction, contradiction
begets heat, and heat rises into rage and ill-will. Then all human judgment is
laid aside and men no longer consider their business transactions as sacred.”).
209
Although the sanction for a breach that falls outside of the customary
zone is larger than it would be in a world with no rough consensus as to the
parameters of the zone, it is not clear that deterrence will necessarily be too
high. In the repeat-play context, this hybrid legal and reputational sanction is
not usually imposed for any one deviation but rather for several. It is therefore
likely to be imposed less often and more accurately than the standard monetary
remedy for breach.
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As each transactor comes to know the other’s business and
switching costs increase, making defection more costly, the CD
zone becomes increasingly stable and the weak-form customs that
initially provided useful relationship-creating norms diminish in
importance. Once this occurs, the transactors can begin to develop
value-creating relationship-specific, relationship-preserving norms
(RPNs) that may (or may not) depart from industry practice, the
transactors’ written contracts, and, in the trade association context,
the default provisions supplied by trade rules.
Sometimes these RPNs may be explicit extralegal agreements
that contradict the contract’s terms. An example is an agreement
not to demand the federally supervised weights required by most feed
contracts, but instead to rely on one another’s in-house weights,
typically splitting any differences that may arise until opportunism is
suspected and one transactor reverts to demanding compliance with
210
the contract. In just this vein, one lumber dealer explained:
Of course, we all know that many small adjustment are made
every day, where allowances asked are not unreasonable and
where the salesman can verify the customers contention, but
when it looks as the ‘something was being slipped over’ or
where the mill will not agree to any allowance, THEN IS
THE TIME TO DEMAND OFFICIAL INSPECTION
ACCORDING TO THE TERMS under which THE
211
LUMBER WAS SOLD.
Other times, RPNs may be variants of the contract’s explicit
provisions that add flexibility by defining acceptable ranges of
performance. Alternatively, RPNs may recast the contract’s explicit
210

Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1793 n 96 (cited in note 13).
See PCSA, The Secretary’s Weekly Letter No 43 (Oct 4, 1911)
(emphasis in original); Fugg v Scattergood (NGFA 1912), reprinted in Decisions
of the Arbitration at 74 (cited in note 49) (in a case where the acceptability of
particular routing was at issue, the defendant “acknowledges that he has used
[that is, accepted] this routing on similar contracts, but states that he did so
because it did not cause him loss or inconvenience, and further that it is their
custom to ignore breaches of the contract where they are not inconvenienced,”
explaining that they “seldom pay any attention to technicalities . . . [that] do
not cost us anything . . . but where a shipper does not fulfill his contract and
the amount involved is sufficient to warrant our insisting upon a shipper
fulfilling a contract we do not think that we should be called technical”).
211
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provisions, which may condition on information that is verifiable
212
but not observable, into extralegal understandings that impose
approximately the same obligations but condition only on
information that is observable to both transactors.
In repeat-play contracting relationships in particular, provisions
that condition only on information that is either observable or both
observable and verifiable are more likely to successfully maintain
cooperation than provisions that condition on information that is
verifiable but not observable. When transactors bargain in the
shadow of information that is only verifiable, in the absence of the
requirement of full disclosure required by the discovery rules, it is
often difficult—if not either impossible or prohibitively costly—for
transactors to credibly reveal to one another the information
necessary for a cooperative adjustment to be reached. It may
therefore be difficult for transactors to recognize the parameters of
the zone of agreement, thereby increasing the risk of cooperative
breakdown. Although most of the economics literature discusses
information that is observable but not verifiable, or information that
is both observable and verifiable, in legal settings one of the most
important types of information is information that is verifiable but
not observable. The rules of civil discovery would make no sense if
this latter category were not of primary importance in defining legal
relations and deciding cases.
Consider, for example, a contract provision calling for the
payment of fully compensatory expectation damages in the event of
breach. Suppose that S inadvertently breaches the contract and, in a
cooperative vein, immediately offers to pay B full expectation
damages. In many contexts, to make B truly whole this measure
would have to include lost profits, which must be calculated by
reference to both expected revenue and expected costs. While B
might be able to credibly reveal his expected revenues, perhaps by
showing S written orders he will be unable to fill, B cannot credibly
reveal his costs. The lower B’s alleged costs, the greater his
recoverable damages. S therefore has no reason to believe that B has
213
accurately revealed all of his costs. In the absence of even the weak
212

See notes 182 (defining observable) and 183 (defining verifiable).
In addition, these costs may also be very complicated to prorate to a
specific contract. Moreover, B may hesitate to reveal them since the next time
213

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

72

threat of discovery sanctions for incomplete information revelation,
B’s revelations will not be credible. This uncertainty may give rise to
suspicion, and may lead the parties to have different views of the
settlement zone. In contrast, had the contract called for damages in
the amount of the difference between the contract and the market
price, the zone of agreement would be clear and, because the breach
was inadvertent, cooperation would more likely be restored.
More generally, because most efficient customary norms and
the relationship-specific RPNs that give rise to them will not
condition on information that is only verifiable, and may condition
on information that is observable but not verifiable, customary
norms are unlikely to be the optimal rules for a tribunal to apply in
the event of a dispute. And, if transactors knew, as they would if
their contract were governed by the Code, that any relationshipspecific RPN followed more than once may be transformed into a
legally enforceable obligation in the event of a dispute, they would
be far less willing to diverge from the terms of their written
agreement, even in situations where doing so is highly beneficial to
one transactor and costless to the other.
214
Understanding these and other reasons why the optimal
B and S negotiate a deal, S will be able to more accurately assess B’s reservation
price.
214
For example, in markets where most transactions are between transactors
with long-term, repeat-dealing relationships with one another, if those
customary RPNs that do exist emerge from pair-wise sets of transactors
choosing independently to follow them as parts of established courses of
dealing, it is likely that these RPNs will be relatively well-suited to mature,
long-standing transactional relationships but relatively ill-suited to new
contractual relationships where trust has not yet been established and the
transactors have minimal information about one another’s business operations.
As a consequence, courts looking to these customary norms to interpret
contracts made in early stages of relationships will be imposing obligations the
transactors did not, and would not, have voluntarily assumed. In addition,
because it will be easier to prove to a court those prior instances where a
practice was followed than it will be to prove that a precondition failed to occur
so a practice was not followed, court interpretations of custom are likely to leave
out important preconditions. Perhaps the most important such precondition is
the degree of trust (defined here to mean a transactor’s perception of the
likelihood that the other transactor will act opportunistically if unconstrained
by a legal or nonlegal sanction) the transactors have for one another. The types
of norms one would agree to be governed by if dealing with an angel are quite
different from the types of norms one would agree to be governed by if dealing
with a scoundrel; yet the ability of courts to distinguish between angels and
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norms to govern a relationship are likely to differ at different stages
of a contracting relationship, and recognizing that relationshipcreating and relationship-preserving norms are likely to differ in
content and structure from the optimal end-game norms for a
tribunal to apply in the event of a dispute, makes it easier to
understand why merchants do not want either their relationship215
specific courses of performance and courses of dealing, or their
every-day customary practices—like granting price adjustments for
216
non-conforming tender—incorporated or written into the law.
It is, however, difficult to empirically verify that weak-form
customs are in fact useful relationship-creating norms and are being
used to initiate repeat-dealing relationships. Nevertheless, as
scoundrels is, on the margin, quite limited.
For a discussion of additional reasons why one would expect both actual and
optimal relationship-preserving customary norms to differ from optimal legally
enforceable contract provisions, see Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1796-1815
(cited in note 13).
215
For example, the Trading Rules of the National Cottonseed Products
Association, Inc. (“NCPA”) prohibit arbitrators from enforcing “terms or
conditions not expressly provided for in these Rules,” except where such
variant terms are explicitly permitted by the rules. NCPA Rules Rule 1 at 34
(NCPA 1994-95). See also Interview with Association Executive (July 1996)
(on file with author). This approach is also adopted by the American Spice
Trade Association whose arbitration board excludes contextual considerations
and only hears cases based on breach of unmodified association-drafted standard
form contracts. Interview with Association Executive (June 1996) (on file with
author). Similarly, preliminary research suggests that arbitrators at the Green
Coffee Association of New York are strictly unwilling to look to course of
performance or unwritten custom of trade. Interview with Arbitrator (April 16,
1998) (conducted by Drew Porter, on file with author) (noting they do not look
to custom); Interview with Arbitrator (April 15, 1998) (conducted by Drew
Porter, on file with author) (noting that arbitrators don’t look to conduct i n
interpreting a contract and stating that any variation from the contract would
be subject to approval by both parties, and any decision to depart from the
contract would require some sort of written proof for arbitrators to take it
seriously”); Interview with Arbitrators (April 14, 1998) (conducted by Drew
Porter, on file with author) (telling the interviewer there are no unwritten
customs). The Association of Food Industries, however, has adopted a slightly
less formalistic approach. If a contract is silent, arbitrators look to custom and
will give contractual language its ordinary meaning in the trade. However, they
do not permit custom to override explicit contractual provisions and will not
take courses of performance or courses of dealing at odds with contractual
language into account in deciding cases. Interview with Arbitrator (February
1997) (on file with author).
216
See note 170 and accompanying text.
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demonstrated earlier, transactors attach a great deal of importance to
their prior dealings with a transactor in deciding how to respond to
217
different situations that may arise, and there is some evidence that
transactors view the early stages of a relationship as a time to learn
218
about one another’s reputation, reliability, and business practices.
In the cotton industry, for example, where mill-buyers consider the
reputation of merchant-sellers to be very important, most mills
consider their own past experience dealing with a merchant to be one
219
of the most important sources of reputation information. Millbuyers explain that to learn about reputation they will typically start
with a “lower quantity deal with an intermediate price,” and then see
what happens; “if [the merchants] are bad,” or “fuss at them a lot,”
220
then they won’t deal with the person again.
217

See notes 206-207 and accompanying text.
See Heggblade-Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc v Sunshine Biscuit, Inc, 59 Cal
App 3d 948, 951-52, 131 Cal Rptr 183, XX (1976). (recounting seller’s
statements that it would “overplant ‘a little bit’ since this would be their first
contract and they wanted to be sure they could produce the quantity needed,”
and the sellers “have picked our best land . . . . For we want to be sure to effect
the best delivery possible;” also quoting from a letter from the buyer stating
that “we would like to start with you on the basis of obtaining 100,000 sacks of
Kennebec potatoes from your operation . . . this arrangement would balance our
needs with the opportunity for you to perform directly for us and evaluate our
relationship. At the same time, it would enable us to do what we have always
done in the past—maintain our loyalty to those hwo have served us well in the
past.”).
219
When ten mills were asked how they obtained information about the
reputation of merchant sellers, nine mentioned their own past experience with
the merchant as a significant source of information, though, as one noted, this
method of obtaining information taught “hard lessons.” Mill Questionnaire No
2 (no date available); id (“my own experience”); Mill Questionnaire No 3 (Jul
28, 1997) (“trade”); Mill Questionnaire No 4 (Aug 6, 1997) (“experience
mostly”); Mill Questionnaire No 5 (Aug 8, 1997) (“past experience”); Mill
Questionnaire No 6 (Jul 30, 1997) (“experience”); Mill Questionnaire No 7 (Jul
31, 1997) (“from prior dealing with him”); Mill Questionnaire No 8 (Jul 29,
1997) (“personal experience”); Mill Questionnaire No 9 (Jul 29, 1997) (“By
doing business with him”); Mill Questionnaire No 10 (Jul 28, 1997) (by
looking at “our past experience with him”). All Mill Questionnaires are on file
with author. Mills explain that they also obtain information about reputation
from other sources including, gossip, the trade press, and their bankers.
220
Mill Questionnaire No 2 (Aug 11, 1997) (on file with author).
Merchants also consider past dealings with a particular mill important to
evaluating the mill’s reputation, but because there are many fewer mills than
merchants, they tend to rely more on the “word on the street,” specifically
Front Street in Memphis, for their information. Yet they too rely on their
218
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Caveat. This account of the emergence of repeat-dealing
relationships, though plausible, is also subject to empirical challenge.
In markets where buyers and sellers play fixed roles in the chain of
production and distribution, buyers as a group and sellers as a group
sometimes have divergent views about the content of these
221
aggregate market practices. These divergences may, in fact, be
wide enough to impede the emergence of repeat-dealing
relationships. However, even in the absence of consensus on the
customs relating to all or most aspects of a transaction, cooperation
may still arise if there is a common view of the practices relating to a
few, preferably core, aspects of trade. If the signal sent with respect
to these issues is strong enough, transactors will likely be more
flexible in dealing with other aspects of trade that contradict their
expectations because they will have greater confidence that their
transacting partner is not a defector.
Perhaps more importantly, however, many merchant industries,
particularly those with private legal systems, are characterized by
222
institutional rules and features, as well as a variety of contracting
own experience to assess reputation, but as one warned, “if you have never dealt
with the other party before, deal in small quantities.” Interview with merchant
(no date available) (on file with author).
221
See, for example, Bureau of Trade Relations, National Retail Dry Goods
Association (“NRGDA”) and SAA, Survey of Trade Practices in the Silk Trade
10 (NGRDA & SAA 1944) (“Retailers report that the average length of time
usually consumed in making returns is approximately four days although a
substantial number of replies indicate that from seven to ten days is the amount
of time usually required. From the manufacturer’s viewpoint, however, replies
indicate that the usual length of time consumed by the retailer in making
returns is seventeen days . . . Both the manufacturers’ and retailers’ replies to
this question [about return times] vary from less than one day to thirty days.”).
See also Note, 61 Yale L J at 702 (cited in note 85) (noting that in the early
rayon industry in which “trade customs, which are understood and in part
written, have not been accepted by both buyers and sellers . . . there is no
uniformity.”).
It is also important to note that in some industries, such as textiles, certain
definitions of quality, like “Seconds” and “first quality,” are not even defined i n
market, regional, or local terms. Rather they are defined in terms of the past
output of a particular mill. See Definitions and Trade Customs, WSR 32
(1936).
222
In some industries, social conditions or past social conditions may also
have supported the emergence of commercial relationships, not only by making
the fact of defection more observable to market participants through gossip
networks that were well-established to meet other needs, such as detecting
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practices, that can best be understood as promoting the emergence
and endurance of the type of common knowledge that is important
to the emergence of repeat-dealing relationships. The adoption of
trade rules might, for example, be understood as an effort to explicitly
223
create this type of common knowledge. Some of these rules
224
explicitly set out acceptable ranges of contractual performance,
while others provide focal points around which acceptable ranges of
outcomes could arise. As one drafter of the 1986 revisions to the
WSRs explained, “these rules provide two businessmen a way to
settle an argument by getting insight into what other businessmen
225
think is standard.” Today, some trade rules have themselves come
226
to be considered the customs of the trade.
Moreover, association-sponsored educational efforts to promote
knowledge of both trade rules and the content of work-a-day
religious deviance, but also through strong interpersonal relationships that
transcended business dealings. These types of forces served to increase the
reputation bond posted in each transaction and to promote common
understanding. In the cotton industry, this function was served by the culture
of honor in the Old South and encouraged by groups like the Cotton Wives
Club of the Memphis Cotton Exchange. In the diamond industry, it was
served by the close-knit nature of Orthodox Jewish Society. See Lisa
Bernstein, 21 J Legal Stud at 130 (cited in note 171). In the textile industry,
closeness was fostered by geographical proximity, see (cited in note 83), and
social events, some of which, like the textile follies, a musical lampoon,
continue to the present day. See Textile Distributors, 55 Women’s Wear Daily,
No 101 at S 36 (May 24, 1988).
223
Interestingly, codified local customs can also promote cooperation even
between transactors in different locations with conflicting codified customs.
Suppose that S promises to deliver lumber “promptly” and does so within 10
days. If “prompt” in the B’s locality means five days, he might classify the
delivery as defection if the term is not defined either orally or in the contract.
If, however, B makes his objection and the reason for it known to S, and S
shows him Trade Rules from her locality defining prompt as 12 days, the B
will likely classify the S’s action as cooperation and simply negotiate a more
specific clause in the future, rather than treat the delay as defection and
terminate the relationship. If, however, the 12 day practice was unwritten, S’s
claim would be far less plausible and relationship breakdown would more likely
follow.
224
See note 185.
225
Palmieri, 16 Daily News Record at 9 (1) (cited in note 84).
226
See text accompanying note 100 (noting that the WSRs have become
custom); Arbitration Practice Upheld, 3 Silkworm 137-38 (July 1921) (noting
that “practically all raw silk is sold under and pursuant to these rules, so that
they have come to bear the dignity of a trade custom”).
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business practices were far reaching, and even today the cotton
industry sponsors an introductory nine week course at Rhodes
College that includes instruction in “the ethical implications of
contracts, contract law, and the importance of contract sanctity; . . .
typical trade terms and conditions in the various markets; . . . [and]
227
international trading rules.” Similarly, the NGFA sponsors trade
rules seminars, in which participants study the trade rules, read
arbitration opinions, work through hypothetical trading situations,
and listen to speeches about trade ethics and proper trading
228
practices.
In most industries these efforts are and were
complemented by extraordinarily active trade presses.
The opinions issued by merchant arbitrators also serve to
promote common knowledge. Although no merchant-run
arbitration tribunals give formal precedential weight to their prior
decisions, the tribunals discussed here, along with many others,
nonetheless produced, published, and widely disseminated
arbitration opinions. Although these opinions served a variety of
229
functions, perhaps the most important was to educate members of
227

Rhodes College Web Site, http://www.meeman.rhodes.edu/
institutes/cotton/curriculum.html> (visited Feb 25, 1998).
228
Similar seminars are run by the Texas Grain and Feed Association. See
Nuts & Bolts of the Grain Trade (flyer describing seminar on contracts, trade
rules, customs, and arbitration, including panel on “Customs of the Trade,”
“Contract Law,” “Arbitration,” and “Trade Rules”). See also Trade Rules as
Amended at Des Moines Meeting, 13 WWGT 26 (Nov 20, 1923-24) (“[F]rom
the standpoint of education it can with truth be said that the annual trade rules
article is about as valuable a contribution as could be made to the members
through their official organ.”).
229
Opinions were viewed as a way of improving the quality of arbitral
decisions by forcing arbitrators to articulate reasons for their award. They were
also a useful, albeit imperfect, check on certain types of arbitral bias. A n
arbitrator who signed his name to a widely-circulated opinion that was
perceived to be biased risked reputational harm and damage to his own
business. In addition, especially in the early days, the production of wellreasoned opinions was one of the ways that the association-run tribunals
attempted to establish their own legitimacy. In industries that published the
names of the disputing parties in the opinions, the prospect that an opinion
would be written was also a way of encouraging settlement. Opinions often
noted that even the prevailing party acted improperly, Cook Industries v Tripple
“F” Feeds, NGFA App Case No 1532 (1977) (affirming the primary arbitration
panel’s judgment against the defendant while noting that the “Arbitration
Appeals Committee observes regretfully that both parties to this transaction left
much to be desired in preparation and performance of the contract.”), thereby
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the trade about the content of the rules and the contours of proper
230
business practices, a function that is still regarded as important
231
today. The interpretation and discussion of these opinions in the
industry-sponsored trade press furthered and continues to further
this norm-inculcation effort.
The membership rules of these associations also facilitate this
method of establishing relationships. Most associations have
232
substantial membership fees and strict membership requirements,
giving both parties a reason to settle. NHA, Report of the First Annual Meeting
XX (1895) (suggesting that because the Kansas City Hay Association has its
opinions “published in the press . . . the result has been that today we do not
have any complaints in Kansas City between Shipper and Receiver”).
230
See, for example, the excerpt from the report of C.F. Kraemer,
Chairman of the NAWLA Arbitration Committee in Convention “Highlights,”
3 Service 1 (May 26, 1930) (NAWLA arbitration opinions help “to avoid
repetition of disputes through the more careful handling of situations likely to
develop into controversies . . . we all profit by our mistakes of the past and
when it is pointed out to us where we have erred either by neglecting to fully
protect ourselves in the original contract or through some oversight and
careless attention to conditions arising subsequent to the contract, we can
certainly be careful to guard against repetition. That, we conceive, to be one of
the important functions of Arbitration.”). See also SAA Fifty-Fifth Annual
Report 35 (1926-27) (“Arbitration has been helpful . . . . It has been found to
clarify, in the thought of the trade, the ethics of a situation; and has also, to a
certain degree, taught the application of official trade practices as compiled by
the several Association divisions.”).
Although merchant arbitrators tended to decide the cases strictly on the
basis of Trade Rules and written contracts, in many industries their opinions
sometimes note that the prevailing party nonetheless engaged in unacceptable
business practices. See, for example, XX. In addition, while none of the trade
rules studied imposed a general duty of good faith and fair dealing, and it was
quite rare for arbitrators to take good faith into account, see Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law at XX (cited in note 13) (reporting that at the Memphis
Cotton Exchange only three of the opinions written from 1944-90 mentioned
good faith), opinions sometimes noted that one party (sometimes even the
prevailing party) or both parties acted in bad faith.
231
The NGFA, for example, whose contemporary opinions are among the
most detailed and comprehensive published, takes the position that
most importantly, the [arbitration] decisions serve as an educational tool
for the industry by communicating how particular disputes have been
resolved. While arbitration decisions are not formal precedent as to
subsequent disputes, they are especially instructive to the membership
because arbitration cases often involve issues faced by others on a daily
basis.
Gordon, A Century of Agricultural Abundance at 57 (cited in note 56).
232
See, for example, Interview with Southern Cotton Association
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permitting just a few dissenting votes to block a candidate’s
233
admission. As a consequence, a transactor who behaved badly in
previous deals with an association member is unlikely to be admitted.
In addition, by joining an association, a transactor implicitly binds
himself to make more aspects of his commercial behavior observable
to market participants. For example, most associations require
members to arbitrate all disputes with other members in the
association’s own tribunals and have a variety of ways of making the
outcomes of cases quickly known to association members. Moreover,
members who either refuse to arbitrate, or who do not comply with
an award, are usually either suspended or expelled from the
association and will typically have their names posted on the
234
exchange floor and/or mentioned in the association’s newsletter
235
along with a description of their wrongdoing. In most industries
these sanctions are severe. Transactors are quite reluctant to deal
with someone who has been expelled from an industry association,
so these sanctions sometimes put the offending transactor entirely
236
out of business. The existence of these rules and procedures turns
membership into a credible signal that a transactor has a low
discount rate since seeking membership, and thereby opening up his
future dealings to more exacting scrutiny, would be irrational if he
did not.
Finally, contracting practices both in merchant industries
governed by private legal systems as well as in those governed by the
Code might also play a role in enhancing cooperation. Buyers’ and
Executive (1996) (noting that dues and fees can, depending on the size of the
firm, be well over $10,000 per year).
233
Southern Cotton Association, By-Laws & Trade Rules Art 2, §§ 1, 2
(requiring that membership candidates be nominated by five members of the
association, that all members be given opportunity to object, that two-thirds
approval of the Committee on Membership be obtained, and that two-thirds of
the Board of Directors vote in favor); see also Interview with Association
Executive (June 1996) (a few objecting members block admission).
234
Bernstein, J Legal Stud at 138-43 (cited in note \* MERGEFORMAT
171) (discussing diamond industry nonlegal sanctions).
235
See, for example, Ten Cases Cleaned Up: Arbitration Committees Decide
Six Disputes—Two are Settled Direct and Two are Expelled, 16 WWGT 39, 40
(Dec 5, 1920-21) (listing the names of those expelled from the association for
failure to arbitrate or failure to pay and arbitration award).
236
See Bernstein, J Legal Stud at 141 (cited in note \* MERGEFORMAT
171).
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sellers’ confirmations often include terms not found in the others’
confirmations. These additional terms are often unenforceable under
237
the Code and may not be enforceable under many industries’
approaches to the “battle of the forms.” The standard explanation
for these terms is that each transactor hopes that the other will
either not know the terms are unenforceable or that the other party
will not risk violating them since he does not have the financial
resources to defend himself if they are litigated. Yet these additional
terms can also be understood as setting the terms that the other
transactor must comply with if he wants the contracting
relationship to continue. In some industries, these terms are supplied
not in fine print on contracts, but on posters at the buyer’s place of
business, or in manuals or circulars the buyer produces and distributes
to his suppliers. The terms are, in effect, providing a more efficient
substitute for common knowledge as to the ranges of practices
considered acceptable. These additional terms are really saying to
sellers, “It is all well and good for you to comply with the contract,
that protects you from suit, but if you want to get repeat business
from us, these are the terms you must meet.”
Conclusion. In sum, weak-form customs are neither optimal
end-game norms nor, for the most part, optimal RPNs. Rather,
they may, under certain conditions, and at certain stages of market
development, provide transactors with a set of imperfect, yet
nonetheless workable, relationship-creating norms. The availability
of these norms—particularly as enhanced by trade rules and other
institutional features of trade-association-run private legal systems is
particularly important in markets where reputation information is
not, standing alone, sufficient either to support exchange between
strangers and/or to induce traders to seek the optimal number of
transactional partners. More generally, the divergence between the
end-game provisions contained in trade rules and written contracts,
on the one hand, and the relationship-creating and relationshippreserving norms that transactors follow in their work-a day
interactions, on the other, together with the acontextual approach
of most merchant tribunals, enables transactors in many industries
governed by merchant-run private legal systems to capture the
237

UCC § 2-207.
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benefits not only of repeat-dealing but also of contracting under a
dual set of legally unenforceable relationship-preserving norms and
legally enforceable end-game norms, each better adapted to the
situations they are designed to govern then either would be to
governing the domain of the contracting relationship as a whole. In
short, this alternative account of the important role played by weakform customs in commercial relationships does not depend on courts
or other third-party arbiters looking to custom to fill contractual
gaps or interpret the meaning of contractual provisions; yet it helps
to explain why merchants consider an understanding of customs, at
least weak form customs, to be central to the conduct of successful
business operations.
IV. CONCLUSI ON
The goal of this Article has been to raise, though by no means
resolve, questions relating to the desirability of the Code’s
incorporation strategy. It has presented evidence that the Code’s
conception of widely-known commercial standards and usages that
are geographically coextensive with the scope of trade does not
correspond to merchant reality but rather is a legal fiction whose
usefulness and desirability needs to be demonstrated and defended
rather than assumed. Although arguments might be developed to
justify the use of this legal fiction as a second-best type solution to
problems of gap-filling and interpretation in commercial law,
nothing in the legislative history of the Code, or the scholarly
literature on commercial law, has yet put forth an adequate
justification for the Code’s and the Permanent Editorial Board’s
broad endorsement of the incorporation strategy.
Indeed, developing a justification for the Code’s approach
would require separate consideration of the wide variety of ways in
which incorporation influences commercial adjudication and,
perhaps more importantly, ex ante contracting practices. In addition,
given the highly local nature of most customs that do exist, any
attempt to rehabilitate the incorporation strategy would have to be
accompanied by the development of complex and explicit choice-ofcustom rules. It would also have to take into account the fact that, as
a practical matter, the incorporation strategy is closer to the pole of a
mandatory, rather than a default adjudicative approach, and that the
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consequences of the approach vary widely in its different and varied
uses. For example, the Code’s use of “commercial standards” in
determining whether a contract is definite enough to warrant legal
238
enforcement
might reinforce the undesirable tendency of
merchants to under-specify their contracts, a tendency that even
239
today merchant associations actively try to combat. Conversely,
the Code provision specifying that when no time is given for an
action to be taken under a contract a “reasonable time” is to be
240
implied may be less problematic. The cost to transactors of
specifying time frames for important aspects of contractual
performance in the boiler-plate on their confirmations is quite low
and might, in fact, be the type of practice we want to encourage
241
through a “penalty default” type of incentive.
The battle of the forms situation, in contrast, is one where the
Code’s incorporation strategy is problematic, especially if the
Hayekian view of custom is incorrect and some customs, while not
quite rising to the level of customs of adhesion, nevertheless favor
certain types of transactors. Under the Code, trade usage is an
important consideration in determining whether additional terms in
238

Id at § 2-204 cmt.
See NGFA, Protecting Your Company’s Interest in Agricultural
Commodities 13-16, 19, 30 (1995) (discussing the importance of entering into
well-specified contracts and urging transactors to do so.). See also sources cited
in note 48 (discussing the tendency of hay dealers to underspecify their
contracts).
240
UCC § 2-309.
241
A penalty default rule is a rule that is deliberately given content that
many or a majority of transactors do not like, in an effort to induce them to
reveal information and/or to adopt a provision better suited to their
transactions. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk and Steven Shavell, Information and the
Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J L
Econ & Org 284 (1991); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87 (1989).
If, however, courts then vary the meaning of explicit timing provisions by
reference to industry practice, the benefits of inducing explicit contracting
might not be attainable under existing doctrine.
Although it has been suggested that the incorporation strategy itself might
be an effective penalty default, inducing industries that could benefit from a
more formalistic approach to opt-out and create private legal systems, it is
important to note that the conditions that make opt-out desirable, and the preconditions necessary to overcome collective actin problems and make opt-out
possible, are quite different. As a consequence, industries that might prefer a
more formalistic adjudicative approach may not be able to opt-out of the Code.
239
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a confirmation “materially alter” the offer and are therefore
unenforceable or whether they fail to do so and are therefore
enforceable unless either the offer limits acceptance to its terms or
the inclusion of additional terms amounts to “surprise or
243
hardship.” If customs favor the stronger party, but do not rise to
the level of imposing a hardship and are not unconscionable, they
will be enforced. This gives large firms, who will also have better
resources to hire experts, the ability to get a significant contracting
244
advantage.
Determining the desirability of other provisions that rely on
incorporation is somewhat more complicated. For example, when
the issue is whether usage should be admissible to show acceptable
customary ranges of quality, it may be that a penalty-type approach
to inducing parties to include more detailed quality specifications in
242
UCC § 2-207(2)(b) & cmts 3, 4, 5. See, for example, Avedon
Engineering Inc v Seatex, 126 F3d 1279, XX (10th Cir 1997) (in deciding
whether an arbitration provision in an unsigned textile sales confirmation form
was a “material alteration” under UCC §2-207 (which would render it
unenforceable), the court looked to see whether the inclusion of an arbitration
clause was customary in the trade, explaining that if it was the provision would
be enforceable); Suzy Phillips Originals, Inc v Coville, Inc, 939 F Supp 1012, XX
(E D NY 1996), affd, 125 F3d 845 (2d Cir 1997) (finding a limitation of
liability clause in the seller’s confirmation to be “standard trade practice,” as
evidenced by the WSRs, the court held that it therefore neither materially
altered the terms of the offer nor inflicted “unreasonable surprise”); Graphics v
Peck Industries, Inc, 304 SC 101, 403 SE2d 146, XX (1991) (same).
243
UCC § 2-207 cmt 4. See also Wilson Fertilizer & Grain, Inc v ADM
Milling Co, 654 NE2d 848, 852-54 (Ind App 1995). In holding that an
arbitration provision in buyer’s order did not materially alter the offer so as to
render the arbitration provision unenforceable, the court explained that the
Code’s
Comments suggest that hardship or surprise may be created by terms that
deviate from customary trade standards and practices, but may not be
created by terms that operate within the accepted norms of the parties’
particular trade . . . while evidence of usage of trade and course of dealings
are not conclusive on the question of surprise . . . such proof is significant
to the issue . . . . In short, a party should not be surprised to find in a
confirmation a clause of a type that is customarily used within the trade,
whereas the clause is an unreasonable surprise where it represents an
unreasonable or harsh deviation from custom.
244
This suggests another reason that transactors routinely keep clearly
unenforceable boiler plate in their contracts. Under the Code, these terms may
be unenforceable today but they may also ripen into a custom if they are used by
other firms with sufficient frequency over a long enough period of time.
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their agreements might work. If, however, it is difficult to describe a
quality standard that a nonexpert court will be able to apply, it might
be better to encourage transactors to include a quality-determining
wiseman provision in their contract. Whether the inclusion of
wiseman provisions in appropriate circumstances is more likely to be
induced by a default rule that enforces every clause precisely as
written, or one that interprets written clauses by customary
practices, is just one of many open questions relating to the Code’s
incorporation strategy that are in need of further exploration.
More generally, it is important to note that one of the primary
justifications for looking to custom to fill gaps and interpret
contracts is that the customs themselves provide useful information
to generalist judges about the intent of the parties, or failing that,
about a range of practices whose widespread use suggests that they
are viewed as reasonable by industry transactors. However,
recognizing that the customs often evolve to govern situations
where transactors trust one another and want to continue dealing,
but that cases arise when the very trust that makes the custom
workable has broken down, suggests that there is no reason to
suppose that customs will provide useful information about what
contracting parties would have agreed to had they included a
provision stating how the matter at issue was to be dealt with if
third party adjudication were required. In addition, because so many
customs have an implied precondition that the transactors trust one
another, and because many customs condition on this and other
information that is inexpensively observable, but that may be quite
expensive to verify (that is, to prove to a court with reasonable
accuracy), even customs that are widely followed may be poor
candidates for judicial enforcement. First, from an ex ante
perspective, transactors are unlikely to want to spend an infinite
amount of money establishing their case if a dispute arises. And
second, third-party application of these types of customs may well be
error prone. Transactors may therefore prefer a third party to apply a
very different rule, one that may be less well-tailored to their
relationship, but easier and less costly to dispute under should a
problem arise.
In sum, while the fact that the Code is built on a highly
questionable empirical basis does not necessarily mean that its
drafters erred, it does mean that it is necessary to inquire into
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whether a justification for the incorporation strategy can be
245
constructed that takes merchant reality as its starting point. This
inquiry is particularly timely, not only because the revised
Code—which extends the incorporation principle—will soon be
submitted to the States for their approval, but also because proposals
to create commercial law in transition economies often take as their
starting point the desirability of codifying existing commercial
practices.

245

Even if in merchant industries that adopted trade rules customs arose as
ranges around these focal point rules, this would still not justify the
incorporation strategy. The industries that have adopted such rules are, for the
most part, precisely those that have also chosen to opt-out of the public legal
system, making it much less common for their disputes to wind up being
governed by the Code in the first place.
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